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Abstract: State governors rediscovered the sweeping contours of their
police powers in imposing recurring waves of COVID- pandemic
shutdowns. However necessary shutdowns have been to slow down
the spread of COVID-, state governors’ actions have exposed how
takings law has become all but toothless in compensating business
owners from state-imposed shutdowns. The result has been state
governors picking economic winners and losers. Stores and sectors
that state governors designated as “essential” have remained
continuously open and received windfalls of pandemic profits. In
contrast, businesses that state governors deemed “non-essential” have
been stripped of their ability to function for months at a time or faced
debilitating restrictions.
Both federal and state constitutions enshrine protection from takings
without just compensation as a foundational principle for property
rights. But courts have narrowed temporary, regulatory takings
doctrines over time to make takings protections all but meaningless
in the face of unprecedented economic disruptions from state action.
This approach has left business owners without any effective legal
recourse and forced them to wait for handouts from the federal
government to mitigate the impact of state shutdowns.
This Article proposes creating economic liberty takings to
institutionalize the compensation of business owners from temporary
shutdowns or substantially similar regulatory burdens that strip
businesses of profitability. The case for reviving temporary, regulatory
takings is that states and localities should be forced to internalize the
costs of decisions that strip business owners of their ability to
function. The logic is not to make shutdowns economically infeasible
for state budgets, but rather to incentivize state governors and
legislatures to strike a better balance between protecting public health
and respecting the economic liberty of business owners. Governors
dealing future crises would have incentives to give businesses scope to
function in economically sustainable ways to sidestep potential
takings compensation.
This Article first makes the limited case for positioning economic
liberty takings within the existing landscape of temporary, regulatory
takings doctrines. Then it shows how courts can modify the seminal
Penn Central test for regulatory takings, the Tahoe-Sierra approach
to temporary takings, and the Lucas lens for categorical takings to
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establish economic-liberty-takings protections for businesses. Lastly,
the Article makes the case for a complementary, statutory approach
that can implement a sliding scale of compensation for regulatory
burdens that do not rise to the level of a temporary, regulatory taking.
These proposals restore greater balance between the exercise of state
police powers and the investment-backed expectations of businesses,
while preserving incentives of affected businesses to work within
temporary, regulatory constraints to maintain their profitability.
This Article then offers a balanced approach to compensating
businesses for economic liberty takings by focusing on declines in net
profits. Courts have traditionally struggled to translate the logic of
real property-based physical-takings compensation to the temporary,
regulatory takings business context. The concern is that using
business losses or revenue declines as metrics for takings
compensation may fuel moral hazard,as these numbers are hard to
verify and easy to inflate. The solution is to offset the expansion of
economic liberty takings eligibility with a limited compensation focus
on businesses’ declines in net profits. Every company must disclose net
profits for federal and state taxation, which means that their previous
years of net profits would be easy to verify. Using the previous year’s
net profits (or a multi-year average) as a baseline for potential takings
compensation would facilitate ease of administration, reward the
honesty of companies in complying with tax law, and serve as a cap
on damages. This approach would also incentivize businesses to
mitigate damages as the limited scope of profit-based compensation
would induce businesses to proactively take cost-savings measures in
the face of potential takings.
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The COVID-19 shutdowns highlighted the extraordinary scope of
police powers that state governors and local officials can exercise and the
lack of incentives to respect private property rights during emergencies.
The states’ powers to impose large-scale shutdowns in the name of a
public health emergency are well-established. 1 But what state officials and
judges broadly forgot in the process is that property rights place limits on
the use of police powers to close businesses or strip them of economic
viability without just compensation. 2
The result has been an unbalanced equation. During the Trump
presidency, state governors and local officials (especially in Democratic
states and cities) stood to gain politically from exercising police powers in
sweeping ways to show that they were leading the effort to slow down the
spread of COVID-19. 3 At the same time, takings law offered little to no
constraint in preventing supposedly “non-essential” business owners from
bearing the costs of periodic state government-imposed shutdowns in the
name of the greater good. 4 The disconnect between the exercise of police
powers and takings constraints has been even more stark because states
and localities have imposed the burden of shutdowns, and largely left to
the federal government the role of partly mitigating the impact of
shutdowns through Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans and
handouts. 5
1
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See Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings,  MICH. L. REV. , – () (providing an
overview of the contexts in which courts have recognized the emergency and public necessity
doctrines for physical seizures and regulatory constraints on the use of property).
2 See Timothy M. Harris, The Coronavirus Pandemic Shutdown and Distributive Justice: Why
Courts Should Refocus the Fifth Amendment Takings Analysis,  LOY. L.A. L. REV. ,  () (arguing
that takings law is inadequate to compensate individuals and businesses impacted by COVID-
shutdowns); see also Ilya Somin, Does the Takings Clause Require Compensation for Coronavirus
Shutdowns?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/XVA-WYAA (arguing that while
compensation for shutdowns is not likely to be legally required under the Takings Clause, there is a
strong moral rationale for compensation).
3 See, e.g., Jack Brewster, % of the States that Reopened Voted for Trump in , FORBES (May
, , : PM), https://perma.cc/BK-UAX (discussing the stark partisan split in reopenings from
shutdowns as  of the  states that reopened in May  were states which voted for Trump, while
Democratic-led states and cities remained shut down to mitigate the spread of the virus).
4 See, e.g., Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf,  A.d , , – (Pa.), cert. denied,  S.
Ct.  () (holding that the shutdowns of non-life sustaining businesses were not takings of
private property for public use); McCarthy v. Cuomo, No. -CV-,  WL , at *
(E.D.N.Y. June , ) (holding that the owner of a gentleman’s club was not denied all economically
beneficial use of his property by COVID- shutdown orders because he had the option to continue food and drink
operations via take-out or delivery services).
5 See Harris, supra note , at –.
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State police powers form part of our forgotten federalism—the sphere
of powers that are solely possessed by the states under our federal
Constitution. 6 The power to shut businesses down in the name of a public
health emergency is clear. 7 However, the significance of the takings clause
and in particular the just compensation provision is also clear as those
clauses provide a check on federal and state encroachments on property
rights. 8 The challenge is determining how these constitutional principles
intersect (or ought to intersect) in the context of extraordinary
government interventions.
The substantive due process Lochner v. New York 9 era of courts broadly
striking down regulations for encroaching on property rights is a distant
memory as the administrative state’s role at both the federal and state level
is virtually uncontested. 10 But the fact that federal and state governments
have sweeping authority to regulate private property (especially in
emergencies) does not mean that federal and state governments should
not face takings compensation consequences for implementing
regulations that deprive business owners of the use of their property. 11 The
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6 E.g., Jennifer Selin, How the Constitution’s Federalist Framework Is Being Tested by COVID-,
BROOKINGS INST. (June , ), https://perma.cc/FNR-DD (discussing how the pandemic
responses have highlighted the role of state governments in addressing emergencies).
7 See infra Section I.B (providing an overview of state police powers).
8 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private,  STAN. L. REV.
, – () (making fairness-based, efficiency-based, and political-based justifications for
takings compensation); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A
Question of Federalism,  U. PA. L. REV. , – () (making fairness and efficiency arguments
for takings compensation); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect
Property,  MICH. L. REV. , – () (making utilitarian-based and fairness-based
justifications for takings compensation).
9  U.S.  ().
10 E.g., Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and
Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,  YALE L.J. ,  ()
(arguing that Mahon recognized the limits of police powers and the need for regulatory takings
compensation); Robert G. Dreher, Lingle’s Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings
Doctrine,  HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. , – () (discussing how the Supreme Court’s Lingle
decision conclusively severed regulatory takings doctrine from due process analysis); William Michael
Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon,  GEO. L.J. , – ()
(discussing the role of substantive due process in the seminal Mahon case that recognized regulatory
takings, but arguing that regulatory takings should be viewed separately from due process concerns
following the end of the Lochner era).
11 Compare Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,  U.S. , , – () (holding that
compensation may be due, including some measure of going-concern value when a laundry was
temporarily appropriated), and United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.,  U.S. , – ()
(holding that compensation was due when property was temporarily appropriated as part of the war
effort), with United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co.,  U.S. ,  () (holding that
government action closing a gold mine to appropriate labor was not a taking due in part to the
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shutdowns were not as invasive as physical occupations of property by the
state. But the economic effect of the prolonged loss of their livelihoods
was nearly as sweeping for many businesses directly affected by the
pandemic shutdowns and occupancy/operation restrictions.
This Article seeks to make the case for shutdown compensation
within the existing framework of temporary, regulatory takings doctrines
and raises both judicial and statutory reform proposals to expand the
scope of economic liberty takings and other takings protections. 12 Unlike
many constitutional constructs that have been sheer creations of judges,
takings protections are clearly enshrined in the texts of both federal and
state constitutions. 13 But in practice, the contours of takings law have been
almost exclusively crafted (if not stunted) by judges. 14 I argue that the
scope of temporary, regulatory takings doctrines lies in historical contexts
unrelated to the sweeping economic impact of the COVID-19 shutdowns.
The changed circumstances caused by the government-imposed
shutdowns justify (1) revisiting these judicially constructed doctrines, and
(2) considering both doctrinal reforms and statutory solutions that may
shape governors’ use of their police powers.
Part I of this Article details the COVID-19 restrictions that occurred
across the country. Part II then shows the limited potential for positioning
economic liberty takings within the existing landscape of temporary,
regulatory takings doctrines and explains how courts can build off
existing doctrines to provide more expansive economic liberty takings
protections. This expansion could occur by modifying the seminal Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City15 test for regulatory takings to
place greater emphasis on the disruption of the investment-backed
expectations of businesses and the economic fallout from regulations;
relaxing the high bar Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
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exigencies of war), and United States v. Caltex (Phil.) Inc.,  U.S. ,  () (holding that the
private property destruction at issue during wartime did not trigger a compensable taking).
12 In an earlier work, I made the case for personal “liberty takings” to compensate pretrial
detainees whose liberty is temporarily “taken” by the state yet are never ultimately convicted of a
crime. See Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 
CARDOZO L. REV.  (). In this work, I explore the contours of “economic liberty takings” and
seek to establish takings protections for businesses that face government-ordered shutdowns or other
restrictions on their activities that strip businesses of their ability to function.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V; e.g., CAL. CONST. art. , § ; see also Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.
v. Chicago,  U.S. ,  () (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fifth
Amendment’s just compensation requirement, thus making the takings clause binding on state
governments). Numerous state constitutions expressly contain the just compensation requirement
for takings. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. , § (a); CONN. CONST. art. , § ; N.Y. CONST. art. , § (a).
14 Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles,  GEO. MASON L. REV. ,  ().
15  U.S.  ().
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Regional Planning Agency 16 has set for temporary takings claims; and
lowering the economic impact threshold for Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council 17 categorical takings. Part III shows the significance of
these proposed reforms by highlighting the range of unsuccessful takings
claims that occurred during the pandemic. Part IV makes the case for a
complementary, statutory approach for claims that may not rise to the
level of a temporary, regulatory taking by constructing a sliding scale of
compensation based on the extent of the impact of regulations on
businesses’ profitability. These proposals restore greater balance between
the exercise of state police powers and the expectations of businesses,
while preserving incentives for businesses to work within temporary,
regulatory constraints to maintain their profitability.
Finally, this Article offers a balanced approach to compensating
businesses for economic liberty takings by focusing on declines in net
profits. Courts have traditionally struggled to translate the logic of realproperty-based physical-takings compensation to the temporary,
regulatory takings business context. 18 The concern is that using business
losses or revenue declines as metrics for takings compensation may fuel
moral hazard as these numbers are hard to verify and easy to inflate and
may disincentivize mitigating damages. 19 My solution is to offset the
expansion of economic liberty takings eligibility with a limited
compensation focus on a business’s declines in profits. Federal and state
corporate tax filings provide a baseline for a business’s net profits. Using
the previous year’s net profits (or a multi-year average) as a baseline for
potential takings compensation would facilitate ease of administration,
reward the honesty of companies in complying with tax law, and serve as
a cap on damages. This approach would also incentivize businesses to
mitigate damages as the limited scope of profit-based compensation
would induce businesses proactively to take cost-savings measures in the
face of potential takings.
Framing the Pandemic Shutdown Problem

rin

This Part describes the challenge of managing a government response
to the COVID-19 pandemic while respecting takings principles. Section A
briefly sets up the nature of the problem. Section B introduces the police
16

 U.S.  ().
 U.S.  ().
18 Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unresolved
Questions,  VT. J. ENVTL. L. ,  ().
19 See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory
Takings,  NW. U. L. REV. , , – ().
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power justifications for pandemic restrictions. Section C uses New York,
California, and Florida as examples of various approaches state
governments used. Lastly, Section D develops a taxonomy of business
restrictions based on severity.
A. The Unique Nature of the Pandemic Threat
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The COVID-19 pandemic has posed one of the greatest challenges to
national and global public health in the past century. 20 The high
transmission rate of the virus, coupled with the global movement of goods
and people, has made this virus particularly difficult to contain as it
continues to mutate and spread both regionally and globally. 21
The uncertain nature and duration of the COVID-19 virus
distinguishes it from other emergencies that our country has faced in
years past. Emergencies such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters have
clear beginnings and ends, 22 while the duration of the COVID-19
pandemic is in constant flux as mutations arise. The foreseeable durations
of more conventional emergencies help to justify temporary governmentmandated interventions that shut down businesses and public life as well
as the absence of compensation for this type of short-duration, emergency
shutdowns. For example, the length and impact of a hurricane can be
measured with relative precision based on experiences with past
hurricanes and meteorological data. 23 Temporary government shutdowns
to deal with this type of threat of finite duration fall within wellestablished emergency exemptions from takings and rarely arouse
controversy. 24 For this reason, most people and businesses voluntarily
comply and accept broad, time-limited sacrifices for the public good in the
case of conventional emergencies. In contrast, the nature and duration of
the COVID-19 pandemic were far from clear.
The extraordinary nature of the COVID-19 pandemic led to similarly
extraordinary government action. Starting in March of 2020, state
governors and local officials began imposing periodic shutdowns of
categories of businesses that bureaucrats deemed “non-essential” in an
20
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See Alfred Lubrano, The World Has Suffered Through Other Deadly Pandemics. But the Response
to Coronavirus Is Unprecedented, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/CQB-MYGJ.
21 E.g., Benjamin Laker,  Challenges Leaders Will Face During the Coronavirus Crisis, FORBES (Mar.
, , : PM), https://perma.cc/CUT-YXT; Lubrano, surpa note .
22 Cf. Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror?,  YALE L.J. , – () (explaining the
challenges of insuring for terrorism and natural disasters, thereby suggesting that the event has a
discrete beginning and end for an insurance payout).
23 EVA LIPIEC & PETER FOLGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF, FORECASTING HURRICANES: ROLE OF
THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER ().
24 See discussion infra Section II.E.

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4005552

iew
ed

George Mason Law Review

82

[Vol. 29:1

pe

er
r

ev

effort to contain the spread of COVID-19. 25 For nearly a year, the scope of
this burden remained unclear because of the open-ended duration of the
threat. Many of the states that lifted these regulations imposed a “second
wave” of partial shutdowns during the summer of 2020 after renewed
spikes in COVID-19 numbers that lasted into February 2021. 26
The subsequent waves of regulatory shutdowns may be more
financially problematic for many businesses than the first wave due to the
weakened balance sheets from the initial shutdowns. The danger of
mutations leading to further large-scale shutdowns and restrictions raises
the need to consider enhanced judicial or statutory frameworks for
compensating businesses adversely affected by these extraordinary
government interventions. 27
As importantly, states and localities had divergent approaches in
terms of the scope of shutdowns. This fact left business owners on
opposite sides of a county or state line in very different economic
circumstances. 28 The result was windfalls for “essential” businesses and ecommerce, but financial disaster for “non-essential” small and large brickand-mortar firms who faced crippling restrictions on their businesses. 29
Crafting regulations that give windfalls to one group by shutting down
competing businesses appears to fit the classic contours of takings law.
But the challenge has been situating takings claims within the broad
deference states enjoy in exercising police powers.
B. The Basis and Scope of State Police Powers
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An irony of the COVID-19 pandemic is that the spread of the virus
poses both a national and international threat, yet the response has been
centered at the state (and local) level. 30 This fact has triggered a revival of
interest in federalism and a focus on police powers vested in states by the
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment. For the past century, most times
that a crisis has occurred, people have looked to the federal government
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25 Xue Zhang & Mildred E. Warner, COVID- Policy Differences Across U.S. States: Shutdowns,
Reopening, and Mask Mandates,  INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, Dec. , , at –.
26 E.g., Bobby Welber, Stricter Bar, Restaurant COVID- Rules Announced for New York, HUDSON
VALLEY POST (July , ), https://perma.cc/DBU-TPE.
27 Holly Yan, Why a nd Shutdown over Coronavirus Might Be Worse Than the st—And How to
Prevent It, CNN (June , , : AM), https://perma.cc/ENE-MSMW.
28 Sarah Mervosh & Jasmine C. Lee, See Which States Are Reopening and Which Are Still Shut
Down, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. , ), https://perma.cc/HU-LAGP (discussing the orders in place around
the country as of April , ).
29 See Susan Selasky, Food Retailers See ‘Eye-Popping Profits’ During Pandemic. But Frontline
Workers Get Crumbs, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. , , : AM), https://perma.cc/VAF-GTLX.
30 Zhang & Warner, supra note , at –.
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to “solve” the problem or at least mitigate the fallout through large-scale,
short-term interventions or infusions of cash. 31 But the COVID-19 crisis
was different because efforts to contain the spread of the virus had to
occur at the state and local level where person-to-person transmission was
occurring. The federal government generally does not have the authority
to regulate intra-state activity unless the intra-state activity falls within
the scope of an implied power of the Constitution or under the Taxing
and Spending Clause. 32 Therefore, crisis management resulted in state
governors (and to a lesser extent local officials) being thrown into the
spotlight in crafting virus containment plans as the federal government
could not act within its powers. As a result, state and locally crafted plans
were often inconsistent with one another and led to businesses of the
same type receiving different treatments.
The police powers of the states are derived from the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which permits state governments to
regulate and restrict property for the public health, safety, and general
welfare of its citizens. 33 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
reinforces this provision by granting the states all powers, which are not
delegated to the federal government. 34 The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that police powers granted to the states extend to all matters “affecting
the public health or the public morals” 35 and that “[t]he states traditionally
have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as ‘to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.’” 36
“When [a] state faces a major public health threat,” such as the
COVID-19 pandemic, the state’s police powers “are at a maximum.” 37 In
Gibbons v. Ogden, 38 the Supreme Court described state police powers as the
ability to control “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a

31
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See, e.g., Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis,
 N.C. BANKING INST. , – () (discussing how Wall Street and Main Street relied on Uncle
Sam’s large-scale interventions to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis).
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § , cl. .
33 Id. art. VI, cl. .
34 Id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
35 Stone v. Mississippi,  U.S. ,  () (considering lotteries).
36 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,  U.S. ,  () (quoting Slaughter-House Cases,
 U.S. ( Wall.) ,  ()) (considering employment).
37 Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel,  F. Supp. d ,  (D.N.M. ).
38  U.S. ( Wheat.)  ().
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State.” 39 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 40 the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a state law requiring vaccinations for smallpox. 41 Justice Harlan
held that “although this court has refrained from any attempt to define
the limits of [police powers], . . . it has distinctly recognized the authority
of a State to enact quarantine laws and health laws of every description.”42
Courts have framed this holding as a two-pronged test which upholds
“emergency public health measure[s] . . . unless (1) there is no real or
substantial relation to public health, or (2) the measures are ‘beyond all
question’ a ‘plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental
law.’” 43
At the same time, Jacobson held that states cannot exercise police
powers in “an arbitrary, unreasonable manner.” 44 Embedded in every
exercise of police power is the tension between protecting public welfare
and respecting individual rights, and state officials have continuously
struggled to balance these interests. 45 Police power is tempered by the
need to respect religious liberty, private property, civil rights, and patientprivacy rights. 46 However, outside of these basic limitations, states
continue to assert broad police powers, especially in the wake of 9/11.
Shortly after 9/11, the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities drafted the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (“MSEHPA”), 47 legislation that seeks to
codify and delineate the specific police powers that state governors
possess, including the power to appropriate, control, decontaminate,
condemn and destroy property in emergencies without compensation,
and involuntarily quarantine people without notice. 48 Forty states have
39
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Id. at  (holding that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause included the power to regulate navigation).
40  U.S.  ().
41 Id. at  (holding that it could require adults fit for vaccination to receive the vaccine).
42 Id. at  (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 Cross Culture Christian Ctr. v. Newsom,  F. Supp. d ,  (E.D. Cal. ) (quoting
Jacobson,  U.S. at ).
44 Jacobson,  U.S. at .
45 See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law,  AM. J.L. & MED. , – ().
46 Jorge E. Galva, Christopher Atchison & Samuel Levey, Public Health Strategy and the Police
Powers of the State,  PUB. HEALTH REP.,  Supp. , at , – (); see also Gostin, supra note
, at – (discussing the ways in which compulsory state actions directed towards persons with
infectious diseases are subject to higher levels of judicial scrutiny, especially when they interfere with
fundamental liberties).
47 CTR. FOR L. & THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT: A DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION (), https://perma.cc/JL-LAZ.
48 Id. arts. V, VI. While many scholars at the time were eager to reshape the landscape of police
powers and increase government authority in light of /, other scholars and policy makers have been
critical of MSEHPA, noting its overly broad grant of state authority, which lacks judicial oversight and
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incorporated MSEHPA in whole or part into state law, a point which
recognizes most states’ broad embrace of police powers. 49
C. The Use of Police Powers to Shut Down and Restrict Businesses
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States have leveraged emergency police powers to impose sweeping
shutdown orders in an effort to contain the transmission of COVID-19.
Most states have created different mandates and regulations for
businesses that state governors deemed “essential” and “non-essential.”
Essential businesses typically include public and private businesses, such
as grocery stores, health care providers, utilities, banks, essential
manufacturing, and gas stations. 50 “Non-essential” typically includes
businesses and places of public accommodation geared towards recreation
and entertainment, like gyms, theaters, salons, dine-in restaurants,
sporting/concert venues, and shopping malls. 51 “Essential” businesses
have been allowed to remain fully or close to fully operational throughout
the periodic shutdowns. “Non-essential” businesses have been affected to
various degrees, sometimes having to completely cease operations, and at
other times facing limits on occupancy or operations based on the extent
of COVID-19 spread or the degree of intensive-care-unit-bed availability
in the region.
To highlight the potential range of takings claims, the following
discussion lays out the types of shutdown orders issued by state governors
in California, New York, and Florida. California and New York are
Democratic states that took the lead in championing COVID-19-related
restrictions, while Florida serves as an example of the strikingly different
approaches that Republican-led states took towards pandemic
shutdowns.

Pr

ep

rin

infringes upon civil liberties. Compare Galva, supra note  at – (arguing that police powers
should be redesigned to allow for greater levels of state authority in response to public health
emergencies, while still respecting individual rights), and Warren Kaplan, Massachusetts Disease
Control Law in the st Century: Running in Place?,  MASS. L. REV. , – () (discussing ways
in which state police power may be utilized more swiftly in response to bioterrorism attacks post/), with Fazal R. Khan, Ensuring Government Accountability During Public Health Emergencies, 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. , – () (arguing that “the gravest threat to civil liberties during a
[public health emergency] stems from federal powers [created post-/], not putative state powers
under the MSEHPA”).
49 Joseph Mishel, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Balancing Public Safety and
Civil Liberties  (Oct. , ) (unpublished comment) (on file with Seton Hall University Law School
Student Scholarship).
50 See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/NK-TERL
(implementing “in-person restrictions” for all businesses except those which are deemed essential).
51 See id. (inferring that “essential” businesses create a category of “non-essential” businesses).

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4005552

1.

New York

iew
ed

George Mason Law Review

86

[Vol. 29:1

tn

ot

pe

er
r

ev

As the initial U.S. epicenter of COVID-19, New York implemented
some of the most draconian executive orders that highlighted the tension
between the use of police powers and potential takings. On March 16,
2020, Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.3, 52 ordering
that gatherings and events of more than 500 people “be cancelled or
postponed.”53 Restaurants and bars were to cease dine-in operations and
offer take-out and delivery only. 54 Video and casino gaming centers as well
as gyms, fitness centers, and movie theaters were ordered to cease
operations. 55 On March 18, Governor Cuomo required places of “public
amusement” to close completely and for shopping malls to close all indoor
common areas to the public. 56 A similar order compelled businesses and
organizations designated as “non-essential” to limit their in-person work
force to 50% by March 20. 57 Businesses deemed “essential,” such as
supermarkets and big box stores with grocery sections, were exempted
from in-person restrictions and benefited from the closure of
competitors. 58 Subsequent executive orders banned in-person work forces
for non-essential businesses and expanded the scope of non-essential
businesses to include barbershops and nail salons. 59
New York began easing the COVID restrictions in May 2020. On May
14, New York lifted in-person workforce restrictions for Phase One
businesses in construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
retail in certain geographic regions. 60 By May 29, Phase Two industries,
like professional services, real estate, retail, and barbershops, were allowed
to operate in-person. 61 On June 12, Phase Three industries in eligible
sectors, such as food services and personal care, were allowed in-person
operations. 62 On June 26, in-person restrictions were lifted for Phase Four
industries like higher education, film and music production, and low-risk
arts and entertainment, including professional sports games without

52

N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/SCV-TX.
Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/HEP-ZQKH.
57 N.Y. Exec. Order No. ., supra note .
58 See id.
59 N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/LUV-KAJ; see also N.Y. Exec.
Order No. . (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/ETK-ZNW.
60 N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (May , ), https://perma.cc/SDY-XFAC.
61 N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (May , ), https://perma.cc/MT-RCDS.
62 N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (June , ), https://perma.cc/WCY-YUC.
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fans. 63 Gatherings of fifty or fewer people were allowed as well. 64 On July
10, malls were allowed to open at 25% capacity. When the second surge of
COVID-19 began in the fall, New York first initiated “micro-cluster”
shutdowns in neighborhoods of New York City, and from November 2020
through January 2021 reinstated many of the more draconian Phase I
COVID restrictions, which were phased out in February 2021 as the
contagion rate receded.
California
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On March 19, 2020, California Governor Gavin Newsom issued
Executive Order N-33-20 directing all residents to stay home. 65 The order
exempted what the governor deemed to be “essential” critical
infrastructure sectors, which encompassed thirteen sectors, ranging from
health care to energy to critical manufacturing. 66 On May 7, Sonia Angell,
the State Public Health Officer of the California Department of Public
Health, issued SHO Order 5-7-2020,67 which outlined Stage 2 reopening
procedures, with counties that showed progress being permitted to move
through Stage 2 more quickly than the State as a whole. 68 Stage 2 included
the limited capacity reopening of some “lower risk” workplaces such as
retail, manufacturing, offices, outdoor museums, childcare, and some
personal services with certain modifications and guidance. 69 Some parts
of the state entered into the Stage 3 reopening of “higher risk” workplaces,
but this process ground to a halt first in July 2020 and then more
comprehensively in November 2020, as California experienced surges in
COVID-19 cases. The California Department of Public Health contains a

N.Y. Exec. Order No. . (June , ), https://perma.cc/JGY-UYEP.
Id.
65 Cal. Exec. Order No. N-- (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/SXQ-GCS.
66 See Essential Workface, COVID.CA.GOV (Sept. , , : PM), https://perma.cc/QRXAT (noting the thirteen sectors of exempted workers); see also Guidance on the Essential Critical
Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID- Response,
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Mar. , ) [hereinafter Guidance on the Essential
Infrastructure Workforce], https://perma.cc/US-GBG. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency guidance is referenced by the California Executive Order N--. See Cal. Exec.
Order No. N--, supra note .
67 Order of the State Public Health Officer (May , ), https://perma.cc/YWV-SJ.
68 Id.; see also Cal. Exec. Order N-- (May , ), https://perma.cc/KYF-YEKB
(authorizing the phased reopening plans).
69 Resilience Roadmap, COVID.CA.GOV (June , , : AM), https://perma.cc/PPFJPMM; see also Industry Guidance to Reduce Risk, COVID.CA.GOV (July , , : PM),
https://perma.cc/ZUU-PAC.
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watch list 70 of counties with coronavirus cases on the rise, and Governor
Newsom announced on July 13, 2020, that virtually every major county in
California had to close a range of businesses including gyms, movie
theaters, salons, family entertainment centers, zoos, card rooms, and
museums. 71 Furthermore, all California restaurants and bars had to close
indoor dining services. 72
These rules were relaxed in the fall of 2020 but in the face of an uptick
in cases, Governor Newsom instituted a curfew for most of the populated
parts of the state starting on November 21. 73 That approach was escalated
into a regional stay-at-home order that applied to virtually all of the state
from December 5, 2020 through January 25, 2021, which prohibited
private gatherings and reinstated widespread shutdowns and occupancy
restrictions of businesses except for critical infrastructure and retail. 74 In
February 2021, California began a phased lifting of most of its shutdown
restrictions.
Florida
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Florida’s Governor Ron DeSantis took a different approach to the
shutdowns and initiated shutdown measures at a slower pace than other
states. Starting on March 17, 2020, the Governor ordered restaurants to
operate at 50% dine-in capacity, and bars and nightclubs to suspend the
sale of alcoholic beverages within thirty days of the order. 75 Three days
later, Governor DeSantis suspended the sale of alcohol on vendor
premises, halted all dine-in operations at restaurants, and closed all gyms
and fitness centers. 76 On April 1, Governor DeSantis issued Executive
Order 20-91, 77 ordering residents to stay home unless to obtain or provide
essential services or conduct essential activities, referencing the

70

County Data Monitoring, CAL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, https://perma.cc/TW-FHE.
Dustin Gardiner, Erin Allday & Tatiana Sanchez, Newsom Orders All California Counties to
Close Indoor Restaurants, Bars, S.F. CHRON. (July , , : PM), https://perma.cc/MD-MYM.
72 Id.
73 See Press Release, Off. of Governor Gavin Newsom, State Issues Limited Stay at Home Order
to Slow Spread of COVID- (Nov. , ), https://perma.cc/VKF-KUL.
74 See Cal. Pub. Health Officer Order (Dec. , ), https://perma.cc/JU-UQZ (tying
widespread business closures in regions of California to intensive care unit bed availability); see also
Blueprint for a Safer Economy, COVID.CA.GOV (Jan. , , : PM), https://perma.cc/KL-L
(announcing end to regional stay at home order).
75 Fla. Exec. Order No. - (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/Y-CMHK.
76 Fla. Exec. Order No. - (Mar. , ), https://perma.cc/MY-ENG.
77 Fla. Exec. Order No. - (Apr. , ), https://perma.cc/UBY-XNZY.
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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) guidance on
essential workers. 78
On May 15, 2020, Executive Order 20-123 79 initiated Phase 1 of the
state recovery plan, permitting restaurants to operate dine-in services at
50% capacity, and allowing in-store retail establishments, museums,
libraries, and gyms to operate at up to 50% of building occupancy. 80
Effective June 5, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order 20-139,81
announcing the transition to Phase 2 for all Florida counties except
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach. Phase 2 allowed for full outdoor
dining capacity and 50% indoor dining capacity for restaurants and bars. 82
Gyms, retail establishments, museums, and libraries could now operate at
full capacity, and amusement parks could reopen subject to approval from
the county. Organized youth activities and professional sports games
could operate with caution as well. Concert venues and theaters were to
remain at 50% capacity. 83 By mid-summer, Florida lifted virtually all
restrictions on the state level, while some localities retained occupancy
limits on a range of “non-essential” businesses. In contrast to California
and New York, Florida’s governor resisted the reinstatement of shutdowns
during subsequent COVID surges during the fall of 2020 and instead
relied on businesses implementing safeguards against transmission. 84
Essential v. Non-Essential Businesses

tn

ot

In all three of these states, clear distinctions were made between
businesses that governors deemed “essential” and “non-essential.” With
the exception of New York—which had its own framework—the other
states broadly relied on the CISA guidance document, which delineates
sixteen industry sectors that the federal government considers “essential
critical infrastructure.”85 Combined with the Empire State Development’s
guidance on the matter, “essential” businesses generally include:

78

Id.
Fla. Exec. Order No. - (May , ), https://perma.cc/RNY-QWA.
80 Id.
81 Fla. Exec. Order No. - (June , ), https://perma.cc/ZWL-AJJ.
82 Id.
83 Id.; see also Fla. Exec. Order No. -, supra note  (authorizing professional sports to
resume training); Fla. Exec. Order No. - (May , ), https://perma.cc/CU-ZT
(authorizing youth activities).
84 See Phillip Valys, Some South Florida Restaurants Close Dining Rooms to Wait out Coronavirus,
S. FLA. SUN SENT. (July , , : PM), https://perma.cc/XGY-Q.
85 See Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce, supra note .
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* health care operations;
* infrastructure (energy, water, waste, transportation,
communications);
* infrastructure-related and life-sustaining manufacturing;
* life-sustaining retail (e.g., grocery stories, pharmacies, gas
stations);
* financial services;
* defense;
* life-sustaining community services (e.g., homeless shelter, food
banks); and
* infrastructure-related construction. 86
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These essential businesses were allowed to operate at close to normal, if
not full, capacities throughout the shutdowns. 87
In contrast, non-essential businesses were forced to close partially or
fully and faced significant constraints amidst gradual reopenings.88
Looking at each state’s reopening plans reveals the types of businesses that
were allowed to reopen first and each state’s stages for reopening (see
Figure 1). 89

86
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Guidance for Determining Whether a Business Enterprise Is Subject to a Workforce Reduction
Under Recent Executive Orders, EMPIRE STATE DEV. (June , , : AM) [hereinafter Guidance
Under Recent Executive Orders], https://perma.cc/HM-LL; Guidance on the Essential Infrastructure
Workforce, supra note .
87 Id.; see also Cal. Exec. Order No. N--, supra note ; Fla. Exec. Order No. -, supra note
.
88 See, e.g., Resilience Roadmap, supra note  (outlining California’s limited return to work after
stay-at-home order).
89 Each state created its own reopening plan. See RE-OPEN FLA. TASK FORCE, PLAN FOR FLORIDA’S
RECOVERY: SAFE. SMART. STEP-BY-STEP. (), https://perma.cc/ZTH-VJ (Florida’s reopening
plan); Reopening New York, N.Y. FORWARD, https://perma.cc/TM-YFNZ (New York’s reopening
plan); Resilience Roadmap, supra note  (California’s reopening plan).
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Figure 1: State-by-State Comparison of COVID-19 Reopenings
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D. The Spectrum of Businesses Affected by the Shutdowns
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Businesses faced different treatment from state governments
depending on the nature of the business and a range of economic
consequences from the shutdowns. The impacts can be categorized across
a spectrum based on the extent of shutdown restrictions, the availability
of alternatives, and the economic toll. The following categorization in
Figure 2 is not exhaustive yet provides examples of the types of business
impacts that may fall along a potential takings’ spectrum.
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Figure 2: COVID-19 Business Restrictions Based on Economic Impact
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Category One businesses include those that have filed for bankruptcy
as a result of the shutdowns, which may result in Chapter 11
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reorganizations or Chapter 7 liquidations. 90 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings
increased by 48% in May 2020 compared to May 2019, and from April to
May alone, bankruptcy filings increased by 30%. 91 Some of the sectors with
the highest number of bankruptcy filings included restaurants,
hospitality, entertainment, and retail, all of which faced shutdowns during
the initial stages of the state responses. 92 Examples of companies that have
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy include: CMX, J.C. Penney, Neiman
Marcus, Brooks Brothers, J.Crew, Muji, Apex Parks Group, California
Resources, and Chesapeake Energy. 93
As businesses deal with the aftermath of periodic shutdowns in
response to COVID-19 surges, experts expect the number of bankruptcy
filings to continue increasing as economic consequences have lingered
long after reopenings. 94 While bankruptcy may lead to reorganizations
rather than wind ups, the economic impact of bankruptcy represent one
of the most clear examples of businesses (and their investors and
employees) bearing the burden from shutdowns of select segments of the
economy for the public good. Some of the affected businesses may have
been teetering on the edge of bankruptcy prior to the shutdowns. 95 Others
such as the bankrupt Garden Fresh Restaurants buffet chain may be
market victims of COVID-19 as their business models may have foundered
due to contagion concerns even in the absence of shutdowns. 96 But the
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90 See generally Bankruptcy: What Happens When Public Companies Go Bankrupt, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. , ), https://perma.cc/FC-E (discussing the different avenues of
corporate bankruptcy).
91 Pandemic Continues to Force Businesses to Explore Bankruptcy, EPIQ ANGLE: BLOG (July , ),
https://perma.cc/KJW-QG.
92 Id.
93 Peg Brickley & Kosaku Narioka, Pandemic Forces Japan’s Muji to Put U.S. Stores into Bankruptcy,
WALL ST. J. (July , , : PM), https://perma.cc/TAH-RNV; Rebecca Elliott, Fracking
Trailblazer Chesapeake Energy Files for Bankruptcy, WALL. ST. J. (June , , : PM),
https://perma.cc/C-LKT; Alexander Gladstone, California Resources, State’s Largest Driller, Files for
Bankruptcy, WALL. ST. J. (July , , : PM), https://perma.cc/LJA-MTHS; Suzanne Kapner &
Andrew Scurria, J.C. Penney, Pinched by Coronavirus, Files for Bankruptcy, WALL. ST. J. (May , ,
: PM), https://perma.cc/EXE-GXMJ; Becky Yerak, Amusement-Park Operator Apex Files for
Bankruptcy, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. , , : PM), https://perma.cc/U-EUX; Retail Industry Turns to
Bankruptcy Due to COVID-, EPIQ ANGLE: BLOG (June , ), https://perma.cc/PGD-AZDC;
Pandemic Continues to Force Businesses to Explore Bankruptcy, supra note .
94 See Katy Stech Ferek, U.S. Business Bankruptcies Rose % in May, WALL. ST. J. (June , ,
: PM), https://perma.cc/CBC-HAR.
95 See, e.g., Kapner & Scurria, supra note  (discussing J.C. Penney’s failure to adapt to ecommerce market prior to the pandemic).
96 Jonathan Maze, The Owner of Souplantation and Sweet Tomatoes Files for Chapter  Bankruptcy,
REST. BUS. (May , ), https://perma.cc/NUF-XH.
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case for economic liberty takings compensation may be at its peak in the
context of bankruptcies induced by regulations.
Category Two businesses were prohibited from operating in-person,
and during shutdowns have no alternative means of making revenue. This
category includes businesses such as:
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* nail salons;
* barbershops;
* tattoo parlors;
* day care centers;
* theaters;
* malls/brick-and-mortar retail;
* casinos;
* smoke/bar lounges & nightclubs;
* zoos & museums;
* gyms;
* live arts;
* non-essential categories of manufacturing;
* recreational sports; and
* places of public amusement. 97
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The nature of the business models for these firms means they are
effectively unable to generate any revenue under shutdowns, making
them some of the strongest candidates for takings claims. For example, a
barbershop or beauty salon could begin selling beauty supplies on the
street outside of their business or attempt online sales. 98 But the nature of
their (typically) small scale and cost structure means that it would be
difficult for these businesses to make this transition in a profitable way. 99
In a survey of over 600 beauty professionals, 96% of respondents said
they became effectively unemployed for months due to the spring 2020

97
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See, e.g., Scott Patterson, As Amusement Parks Reopen, Will Americans Ride Roller Coasters in a
Pandemic?, WALL. ST. J. (June , , : AM), https://perma.cc/ZV-YAW (“We’re not a restaurant
that can still do carryout. We went from being open to % shuttered.” (quoting an amusement park
CFO)).
98 See Margot Roosevelt, Will Small-Business Owners Go to Jail for Breaking Coronavirus Rules?
We’ll Find out, L.A. TIMES (May , , : AM), https://perma.cc/MXV-AYGM (noting that street
sales for one L.A. beauty salon could not cover shutdown loss, only half of previous sales).
99 Id.
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* tourism;
* hotels;
* recreation/amusement parks;
* summer camps & programs; and
* hunting & sport retail. 103

ev

shutdowns. 100 The top two industries that had the highest rates of
government shutdowns in April 2020, when closure rates were the highest
across all sectors, were (1) health and beauty, and (2) arts and
entertainment, with 89% and 79% closures respectively. 101 With the
average small business only holding a cash buffer of twenty-seven days, it
is no surprise that these business sectors had the highest permanent
closure rates during the pandemic. 102
Category Three businesses include seasonal and regional businesses
in which the bulk of revenue is generated in a place or time of year that
may be particularly exposed to a multi-month shutdown or
occupancy/operations limits. Examples include:

100
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Because they often have low-margin, high-volume revenue models,
businesses like amusement parks, ice cream parlors, restaurants, and
tourism-related businesses are in jeopardy, if they are forced to shut down
or operate at limited capacities. 104 For these businesses, even being
permitted to operate at limited capacity may not necessarily justify the
costs of actually opening. 105 For example, many amusement park
companies earn the bulk of their income during the summer months due
to both climate and school vacations facilitating family travel. 106 States and
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Alena Maschke, ‘Many of Us Have Run Out of Money:’ With Reopening Months Away, the Beauty
Industry Struggles to Survive, LONG BEACH BUS. J. (May , ), https://perma.cc/YHL-QEDV.
101 Report: How Many Local Businesses Have Had to Close Due to COVID-?, WOMPLY,
https://perma.cc/MMU-WLYX (charting business closure rates by business category).
102 See DIANA FARRELL & CHRIS WHEAT, CASH IS KING: FLOWS, BALANCES, AND BUFFER DAYS:
EVIDENCE FROM , SMALL BUSINESSES, JP MORGAN CHASE INST.  (); see generally Ruth
Simon, Amara Omeokwe & Gwynn Guilford, Small Businesses Brace for Prolonged Crisis, Short on Cash
and Customers, WALL ST. J. (July , , : AM), https://perma.cc/HJY-MZSZ.
103 See, e.g., Charity L. Scott & Liam Pleven, Summer Businesses Fear Coronavirus Lockdowns Means
a Lost Season, WALL ST. J. (Apr. , , : AM), https://perma.cc/EGR-THDT.
104 See id.
105 One restaurant owner exclaimed, “You can’t make money at % full. So, there’s a lot of
challenges.” Id.
106 Id. (discussing how cold climate seasonal and regional businesses faced ruinous economic
consequences from spring and summer shutdowns).
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regions that have major tourism industries experienced the seasonal
effects of shutdowns even more. 107 Hawaii’s shutdowns, for instance, are
projected to lead to roughly 25% of its businesses closing permanently
with impacts on restaurants, hotels, and other related businesses, such as
shops and tour operators. 108
Businesses that are regionally based, such as those concentrated in
downtown districts, tourism hotspots, and college towns, share parallel
shutdown consequences with seasonal businesses. 109 Service sector
businesses, such as law and accounting firms located in downtown areas,
still flourished throughout the shutdowns because most employees could
work from home. 110 But businesses that cater to downtown firms, such as
restaurants, retail, and sundry shops, lost their customer bases due to the
shutdowns and could not easily transplant their businesses elsewhere. 111
Most American downtowns had foot traffic plunge by 75% during the
shutdowns from April 2020 through August 2020, and the hangover effect
of shutdowns left downtown businesses facing economic challenges even
after they were able to partly reopen. 112 For example, hotels in downtown
Portland have seen an approximately 75% decline in occupancy after
reopening compared to the prior year, and downtown stores faced similar
revenue shortfalls because of continued restrictions on adjacent
businesses. 113
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See Kim Mackrael, Coronavirus Hits Hawaii’s Tourism-Dependent Workforce Hard, WALL ST. J.
(May , , : AM), https://perma.cc/HMP-UFG (noting the importance of tourism in Hawaii’s
economy).
108 Id.; see also Fred Bever, Maine’s Seasonal Businesses Feeling Economic Effects of the Coronavirus,
NPR (May , , : AM), https://perma.cc/DN-BG (describing tourism communities in
Maine facing similar crises despite low infection rates).
109 E.g., Justin Baer, College Town Economies Suffer as Students Avoid Bars, Football Tailgating,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. , , : AM), https://perma.cc/AZR-VJX (discussing how Virginia Tech’s
local economy continued to struggle after students returned due to social distancing preferences and
precautions).
110 E.g., Andrew Maloney, After Profits Soared in , Firms optimistic About Revenue Uptick This
Year, AM. LAW. (Feb. , , : PM), https://perma.cc/ESK-KG (noting that across  major
firms net income was up .% during the pandemic due to reduced discretionary and travel spending
costs compared to .% growth in ).
111 E.g., Jamie Goldberg, Downtown Portland Businesses, Derailed by Pandemic, Say Protests Present
a New Challenge, OREGONIAN (Aug. , , : AM), https://perma.cc/ECZ-CX (discussing how
one downtown Seattle pizzeria recalls daily sales as low as $., attributing the losses to absent office
workers and tourists).
112 E.g., id. (discussing how foot traffic in downtown Portland declined by over % during the
summer of ); cf. Carmen Ang, Pandemic Recovery: Have North American Downtowns Bounced
Back?, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Nov. , ), https://perma.cc/VP-WRAF (comparing reductions in
downtown office traffic across American metropolitan areas).
113 Goldberg, supra note .
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Category Four businesses include those that were forced to shut
down in-person operations yet had alternative ways of making some
revenue. Examples of these businesses include:

ev

* restaurants with take-out / fast food restaurants;
* online fitness classes;
* virtual arts and entertainment;
* retail with online business; and
* office-based professional services. 114
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The most fruitful example for this category would be sit-down
restaurants once they were allowed to resume take-out operations. For
retail, the types of businesses that would fall under this category would be
those that operate both online and in-person. For most retail stores, online
sales constitute only a small portion of their overall sales, and as a result,
by July 15, 2020, only 69% of retailers had made their rent payment for the
month. 115 Both the restaurant and retail industries suggest that even
though alternative methods of sales are possible, they may not make up
for the lost revenue from in-person sales due to the shutdowns.
Category Five includes businesses that were later allowed limited
outdoor operations in May and June 2020, like restaurants, youth
programs, recreational sports, and fitness classes. Towards the end of May,
restaurants, many of which could now offer limited outdoor dining, were
experiencing a 24–37% dip in daily revenue when compared to 2019. 116 In
terms of youth sports programs, an April 2020 poll conducted by the
Aspen Institute’s Project Play initiative revealed that 38% of local sports
leaders expected to lose up to 50% of their revenue over the next year. 117
Two-thirds of youth summer camps closed for the 2020 summer season.118
114
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See, e.g., Jaewon Kang, Whole Foods CEO John Mackey Says Many People Are Done with Grocery
Stores, WALL ST. J. (Sept. , , : AM), https://perma.cc/EU-PB (noting how consumer
spending habits have shifted online for purchasing groceries).
115 Aisha Al-Muslim & Soma Biswas, Retail Carnage Deepens as Pandemic’s Impact Exceeds
Forecasts, WALL ST. J. (July , , : AM), https://perma.cc/LJG-RP.
116 Data Dashboard: How Coronavirus/COVID- Is Impacting Local Business Revenue Across the
U.S., WOMPLY [hereinafter Data Dashboard, Business Revenue], https://perma.cc/BXX-HYV
(comparing multiple industries in each state: Average Revenue Last Week vs. Same Week In ).
117 Jay Cohen, Youth Sports Coalition Seeks Federal Aid Due to Coronavirus Pandemic, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (May , ), https://perma.cc/VHT-TK.
118 Megan Leonhardt, Coronavirus Forced % of Summer Camps to Close This Year and Early
Estimates Predict the Industry Will Take a $ Billion Revenue Hit, MAKE IT (July , , : AM),
https://perma.cc/LV-VDBU.
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Around 27% of these closed camps offered some form of virtual camp,
generating some revenue, but not enough to make up for normal
earnings. 119
Category Six businesses include those that were later allowed indoor
operations, usually at limited capacities of 25% to 50%. Many businesses
like restaurants, barbershops, salons, casinos, and gyms fell into this
category as states eased restrictions. 120 These changes resulted in the
reversal of fortune for many businesses. For example, in June 2020,
restaurants with outdoor or limited indoor dining experienced a 20% dip
in daily revenue from a year earlier—a significant improvement from the
66% decrease back in late March 2020 when restaurants fell into Category
Five of take-out and delivery only. 121 Health and beauty businesses that
were allowed to reopen earlier in 2020 enjoyed an increase in daily
revenue due to pent-up demand. 122 In contrast, when Maryland reopened
its casinos at 50% capacity in June 2020, revenue had declined by 27% from
the previous year. 123
These are just examples of the kinds of businesses that may fall into
each Category in Figure 2. 124 With each reopening phase, some of these
businesses will shift down the spectrum as they are allowed to resume
various levels of operations. Some businesses will also fall into multiple
Categories based on the extent of restrictions for different parts of their
operations.
II. An Overview of Existing Temporary, Regulatory Takings Law
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ot

This Part provides an overview of the existing temporary and
regulatory takings doctrines. Section A lays out the tension between
takings and the police power. Section B discusses the origins of regulatory
takings. Section C outlines current takings doctrine, and Section D
119

See id.
See, e.g., Fla. Exec. Order No. -, supra note  (reopening bars and restaurants to %
capacity).
121 Data Dashboard, Business Revenue, supra note .
122 Cf. Jeffry Bartash, U.S. Retail Sales Jump .% in June, but Fresh Coronavirus Outbreak Poses New
Hurdle, MARKETWATCH (July , , : AM), https://perma.cc/V-KBE (discussing the positive
impact that pent-up consumer demand had on retail sales in June ).
123 Amy Kawata, Coronavirus Impact: Report Shows Significant Drop in Casino Revenue Despite
Reopening, CBS BALT. (July , , : PM), https://perma.cc/CJH-YFBB.
124 States have categorized businesses in various ways, but there are general similarities, such as
the reopening of outdoor and indoor operations at limited capacities. See, e.g., Tom Wolf, Industry
Operation Guidance, SCRIBD (May , , : AM), https://perma.cc/KXS-GEF; Guidance Under
Recent Executive Orders, supra note ; What’s Closed Under the State or Local Health Orders?, SANTA
CLARA CNTY. PUB. HEALTH (July , ), https://perma.cc/RF-E.
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addresses some limitations of the doctrine when regulatory takings may
not apply. Section E notes recognized exceptions to regulatory takings,
such as emergency takings. Finally, Section F critiques the reluctance of
courts to address the relationship between takings and state police power.
A. The Tension Between Police Powers and Takings Protections
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While the efficacy of shutdowns in slowing down the spread of the
virus has been a matter of public debate, courts have clearly established
the legality of police power-based shutdowns. 125 The question is whether
state governments are obligated to compensate business owners for
shutdowns that impose burdens on segments of the business world for the
good of the many. The purpose of having shutdowns recognized as
temporary, regulatory takings is not to question the exercise of state police
powers, but rather to incentivize state governments to internalize some of
the economic costs that shutdowns impose. 126 That way government
actors will have reasons to develop a more thoughtful approach to
shutdowns (and future exogenous shocks requiring state intervention)
that minimizes the economic impact.
State governors have effectively imposed unfunded mandates on
businesses. 127 State legislatures have been largely powerless to temper the
shutdowns, and the affected businesses have been left with no substantive
legal recourse. 128 Governors simply face no meaningful oversight or
accountability for these exercises of their police powers except for the
distant prospect of future elections. The hope is that once shutdowns are
recognized as economic liberty takings, states will be forced to internalize
the economic consequences of shutdowns. This accountability will foster
more carefully tailored uses of police power during the pandemic and
future emergency situations that recognize the need for state action but
also respect private property rights.

125

See infra Section II.E.
See, e.g., Roger Hanshaw, Paying for a Pandemic: “Just Compensation” and the Exercise of Police
Powers for Public Safety, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Winter , at , –.
127 See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. ., supra note ; Cal. Exec. Order No. N--, supra note
.
128 This has lead states like Pennsylvania to pass constitutional amendments through
referendum to allow legislatures to limit their governor’s use of emergency powers. See Marc Levy &
Michael Rubinkam, Pennsylvania Voters Impose New Limits on Governor’s Powers, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(May , ), https://perma.cc/TSQ-GTZ.
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Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the government
may take private property “for public use” through a regulation or through
the exercise of eminent domain, so long as it pays “just compensation.”129
The just compensation requirement seeks to prevent the government
from forcing select groups from bearing burdens for the public good. 130
Regulatory takings temper state police powers by mandating just
compensation if a regulation goes “too far” in restricting property rights. 131
“The basic understanding of the Fifth Amendment makes clear that it is
designed not to limit the government interference with property rights
per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking.” 132 Therefore, properly framed takings
claims in response to shutdowns would not allege that a state exceeded
police powers, but rather that the state needs to internalize the costs of
shutting down economic activity by paying just compensation to affected
businesses.
Broad deference to state executive power may be needed in
emergencies, but there must be a point at which the exercise of executive
power triggers a temporary, regulatory taking and just compensation for
affected property owners. Most state governors (and mayors) enjoy fouryear terms and in the case of governors, enjoy virtually unfettered
authority in exercising police powers. 133 This fact means governors are
exercising emergency police powers without any accountability from the
legislature, and accountability to the people in the form of reelection is
often a distant prospect years away. 134 The takings doctrine is designed to
ensure balance occurs in the exercise of police powers for public purposes
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129 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similar takings provision exist in state constitutions. E.g., CAL. CONST.
art. , § (a); CONN. CONST. art. , § ; N.Y. CONST. art. , § (a).
130 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,  U.S. , – (); Armstrong
v. United States,  U.S. ,  ().
131 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,  U.S. ,  ().
132 First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,  U.S. ,  ()
(emphasis omitted).
133 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § -A- (West ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § A:-.
(West ); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §  (McKinney ).
134 The notable exception is California Governor Gavin Newsom who faced a recall election,
largely driven by a backlash to the state’s COVID response. See Sarah Abruzzese, Gavin Newsom and
the Coronavirus-Driven Recall Effort, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. , ), https://perma.cc/AXNEYE.
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by incentivizing state governors (and local officials) to factor the costs of
their actions into how they structure government interventions. 135
Courts have often conflated the question of the permissible scope of
state police powers with the issue of regulatory takings compensation.136
In 1887, the Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas, 137 held that a statute
which prohibited the manufacture and sale of alcohol did not constitute
a compensable taking because the legislation was a valid exercise of state
police power enacted for health and safety purposes. 138 The court
distinguished an exercise of state police power from a taking, explaining
that the former seeks to abate a public nuisance, while the latter takes
property away completely and involves a physical taking of property. 139
This distinction was problematic in restricting takings to physical
appropriations of property. 140
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 141 corrected this problem by
introducing the concept of regulatory takings. The Supreme Court
recognized a regulatory taking in a case in which a state regulation barred
an owner from mining his own mineral claim, the government’s
justification being to protect others’ surface-level buildings. 142 “[W]hile
property may be regulated to a certain extent [under a valid exercise of
state police powers], if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”143 Two factors should be considered when determining if a
regulation goes too far: (1) the extent of the diminution of the property
value, and (2) the public interest underpinning the regulation. 144
After Mahon, the focus in regulatory takings has been on whether the
extent of property value reduction triggers just compensation. 145 Four
years later, the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.146
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Under physical takings, the government must go to court to seize the property at issue; while
under regulatory takings, the government is free to issue regulation and the affected property-owner
must go to court to claim the takings. Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts,  U. CHI.
L. REV. ,  () (“[I]nverse-condemnation actions amount to a kind of eminent domain
proceeding in reverse; . . . they ask if property has been taken and the government should thus be
forced to pay.”).
136 See, e.g., Mahon,  U.S. at –; Mugler v. Kansas,  U.S. , – ().
137  U.S.  ().
138 Id. at , –, .
139 Id. at .
140 See Shai Stern, Taking Emergencies Seriously,  URB. LAW. , – ().
141  U.S.  ().
142 Id. at –.
143 Id. at .
144 See id. at –.
145 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. ,  ().
146  U.S.  ().
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signaled how high the bar would be for regulatory takings when the
introduction of a zoning ordinance that diminished property values by
75% was not recognized as a taking. 147 The ensuing century of regulatory
takings cases have continued to set a high threshold for takings claims,
even as the reach of the administrative state has dramatically expanded.148
C. Current Regulatory Takings Doctrine
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Regulatory takings have evolved over time into three judicially
constructed categories: permanent physical intrusions, total per se
takings, and the catch-all, ad hoc balancing test for partial takings. 149 Most
regulatory takings regulations are analyzed under the ad hoc balancing
test for partial takings established by Penn Central. 150 But courts first look
to see whether the regulation is governed by one of the two categorical
takings categories: (1) a forced, permanent, and physical appropriation of
property, or (2) a regulation that deprives a property of all economically
viable uses. 151 Courts have generally not regarded temporary takings as
falling within either of these two categorical takings categories and
analyzed temporary takings claims under the partial takings Penn Central
test. 152
Categorical Takings

a.

ot

The two types of categorical takings are (a) permanent, physical
appropriations of property, and (b) regulations that deprive property of all
economically viable uses.
Permanent, Physical Appropriation or Intrusion
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 153 established that a
forced, permanent, and physical appropriation of property is a categorical
taking. 154 In Loretto, the Supreme Court held that a state law that
authorized cable companies to install cables on property without the
property owner’s consent are takings “without regard to the public
147
148
149
150
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Id. at , .
See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin,  S. Ct. , – ().
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,  U.S. , –, – ().
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  ().
See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,  S. Ct. , – ().
See id. at .
 U.S.  ().
See id. at .
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Deprivation of All Economically Viable Uses
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interest that it may serve.” 155 A challenge in analyzing this categorical
takings category is determining what constitutes a permanent physical
intrusion. Following Loretto, “permanent” was framed as meaning
continuous as opposed to temporary and limited. 156 However, this
definition became muddled after the Supreme Court’s decision in Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 157 in which the Supreme Court held that
a state imposition of a beach access easement on a landowner’s property
constituted a permanent physical occupation requiring compensation. 158
Nollan blurred the line between permanent and temporary physical
invasions. Nollan also led lower courts to develop inconsistent definitions
of “permanent,” with some defining it to mean a “substantial” burden on
property and others focusing on the idea of a “fixed” burden on property
owners. 159 This “shadow Loretto doctrine” from the lower courts highlights
the potential elasticity of the Loretto doctrine in addressing regulatory
burdens on property. 160 While Loretto and Nollan raise questions about the
scope of regulatory burdens, the Lucas categorical takings test and Penn
Central test for partial takings matter far more for understanding
temporary, regulatory takings.

155

ot

The second category of per se categorical takings consists of
regulations that deprive property owners of all economically viable uses of
their property. Lucas established that a regulation is a compensable taking
if it “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” 161 The
Id. at –.
The Court clarified this notion of fixed by distinguishing Loretto from Kaiser Aetna v. United
States and Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, the latter involving physical invasions that were
temporary and limited in nature, and hence not a permanent total taking. See Pruneyard,  U.S. ,
 () (concluding that the California Constitution’s protection of free speech and petition was not
a taking against private shopping center owners when those rights were exercised on shopping center
grounds); Kaiser Aetna,  U.S. ,  () (holding that the Hawaiian government’s navigational
servitude requiring petitioners to grant public access to a previously private pond was a compensable
taking).
157 See  U.S.  ().
158 Id. at , – (holding the California Coastal Commission’s permit grant, which was
conditioned on appellants’ allowance of an easement along their beach for public use, was a
permanent, physical taking).
159 See Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth,  FORDHAM L. REV. , – () (arguing that
the total takings doctrine, which includes physical invasions, is incoherent in a way that makes it
difficult for lower courts to apply).
160 Id. at –.
161 Id. at ; see also id. at – (holding that a South Carolina statute which prohibited
Lucas from building any habitable structures on his land was a categorical compensable taking).
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Court equated a regulation that deprives a property owner of all
economically viable uses of their property to a “physical appropriation,”
which should be treated like a permanent physical invasion. 162 In Lucas,
the purchaser of coastal property lots faced a regulation that barred
development on the land, which effectively denied all economically viable
uses of the land. 163 While this categorical taking opens the door to
regulatory takings claims, the Supreme Court to date has had a mixed
record in how broadly to interpret this categorical taking. On the one
hand in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 164 the Supreme Court found that a
regulation that leads to a 94% reduction in property value does not
amount to a Lucas categorical taking. 165 But on the other hand, the Court
expanded on Lucas in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 166 by holding that
the physical appropriation of personal property—in that case, a marketing
order requiring raisin growers to give a percentage of their crops to the
federal government—constituted a per se taking. 167
Rather than reducing the complexity and volume of litigation, both
Lucas and Horne represent bright-line rules that are ill-defined around the
edges and have resulted in little success for plaintiffs. 168 The limited
applicability of Lucas bright-line rules raises the significance of the third
category of regulatory takings, which utilizes a multi-factor balancing
test. 169
Partial Takings and the Penn Central Balancing Test

162

ot

If a regulatory takings claim does not meet the criteria for a
categorical taking, then it falls under the third category of partial takings,
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Id. at –.
Id. at –.
164 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,  U.S.  ().
165 Id. at –, .
166  U.S.  ().
167 Id. at –, .
168 See Blais, supra note , at –. Multiple studies have shown that after Lucas, the number
of takings claims decreased and have experienced little success in federal and state courts. See, e.g.,
James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings,  WM. & MARY L. REV. , 
() (finding that for total takings cases from  to , the success rate of such claims dropped
from .% to .% after the Lucas ruling in ); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,  YALE L.J. ,  () (explaining that even with per se takings
issues, the Court provides relatively little guidance to lower courts since Lucas requires courts to take
into account background principles of property law, which vary by state).
169 See Blais, supra note , at –, .
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established by Penn Central. 170 In Penn Central, New York City passed a
historic preservation ordinance that prohibited Penn Central from
building a tower over Grand Central Station. 171 Penn Central argued that
this ordinance was a taking because it substantially reduced the economic
value of their property and unfairly singled them out with a unique burden
in the name of the public interest. 172 In rejecting Penn Central’s claims, the
Supreme Court applied a multi-factor balancing test for determining
whether a government regulation constitutes a taking. 173 The Penn Central
test requires courts to assess: (1) the character of the government action,
(2) the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, and (3) the extent
to which the regulation interferes with the landowner’s reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 174

The Economic Impact of the Regulation
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The first prong of Penn Central holds that regulations are more likely
to be treated as a taking if they constitute a forced and permanent physical
invasion of property, the taking of a core property right, or if the property
owner in question is unfairly burdened relative to others. 175 In contrast,
courts are less likely to find a takings claim if the purpose of the regulation
is to protect the community or if there is an average reciprocity of
advantage (i.e., the burden in one regulatory context is offset by other
burdens facing other parties). 176 Penn Central itself serves as a cautionary
tale in how far courts will go in deferring to government action. The
Supreme Court held that Penn Central was not unfairly singled out
because over 200 buildings were also restricted by the ordinance (in a city
of one million structures), which weighed in favor of denying a taking. 177
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The second prong of Penn Central holds that regulations are more
likely to be takings if they destroy most or all economically viable uses of

170
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Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  (); see also Serkin, supra note
, at –.
171 See Penn Cent.,  U.S. at –.
172 Id. at .
173 Id. at .
174 Id.
175 See id. at –.
176 See id. at –.
177 Penn Cent.,  U.S. at –, .
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property that are not justified by a strong public interest. 178 Regulations
are likely not a taking if they leave the owner with viable economic use of
their property or a reasonable return on their investments. 179 In Penn
Central, the Supreme Court found that because the ordinance prohibited
additional construction on Penn Central’s property, the regulation did not
affect the present value or use of the property as a train station. 180
Courts have often been leery of finding regulatory takings because of
the difficulties of quantifying the economic impact of regulations. 181 The
concern is that non-regulated industries do not have set rates of return on
their capital that can serve as benchmarks of economic impact and instead
require case by case analysis of the impact of regulation on a given
business. 182 Thus, courts traditionally look to evidence of business losses
or revenue declines due to regulations. 183 The challenges of applying these
lenses for compensation is that they may fuel moral hazard as these
numbers are hard to verify and easy to inflate and may disincentivize
business efforts to mitigate damages. While the economic impact of
regulations may be clear, courts may be reluctant to open up the doors to
a pandora’s box of regulatory takings compensation calculations.
What is clear is that a high degree of economic impact is required in
order to establish a regulatory taking. As the Supreme Court in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 184 framed the issue, the economic impact from
regulations must be so severe that it is “functionally equivalent” to a direct
appropriation. 185 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which handles most
takings claims against the federal government and repeatedly utilizes the
comparable sales approach, generally looks for a diminution of value “well
in excess of 85 percent.”186

178

Id. at –.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,  U.S. , –,  n. ().
180 Penn Cent.,  U.S. at –.
181 Murr v. Wisconsin,  S. Ct. ,  () (listing the economic impact as one of the
“complex” factors to consider in assessing regulatory takings).
182 See id. at – (holding that “the ultimate question [of ] whether a regulation has gone too
far . . . cannot be solved by any simple test”).
183 See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ).
184  U.S.  ().
185 Id. at .
186 William C. Means, Jr., The Economic Value of Conserved Land: Examining Whether Conservation
Easements Represent a Sufficient Source of Land Value to Influence the Outcome of Regulatory Takings
Claims,  OHIO ST. L.J. ,  () (quoting Walcek v. United States,  Fed. Cl. ,  ()).
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The third prong of the Penn Central test considers the extent of
“interfere[nce] with distinct investment-backed expectations.”187
Government action is more likely to be treated as a taking if the property
owner has substantially invested in reasonable reliance on an existing
regulatory scheme. 188 If the regulation was foreseeable prior to the
property investment, the regulation is less likely to be found a taking. In
Penn Central, the court held that because the train station was entitled to
continue its present use, the regulation did not interfere with investmentbacked expectations enough to weigh in favor of a takings finding.189
Similarly, in Palazzolo, when the property owner was denied permits to
develop his waterfront property, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found
that there was no reasonable investment-backed expectation as the law
was already in place prior to the acquisition of the land from the previous
owner. 190 However, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an awareness of
the law prior to purchasing the land does not necessarily immunize the
state from a property owner’s investment-backed expectations. 191
Therefore, a state’s reliance on existing laws does not create a blanket of
immunity when dealing with investment-backed expectations.
The Penn Central test provides the appearance of balancing
government interests and private property rights. But in practice, courts
have applied this test in ways that are deferential to federal, state, and local
governments. 192 Typically, a court will not find a compensable taking
under Penn Central if the parcel as a whole retains some degree of
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  ().
See, e.g., Stone v. City of Wilton,  N.W.d , – (Iowa ) (holding that securing
loans and paying engineering fees to build a home did not satisfy this prong of the Penn Central test
because no actual construction had begun).
189 Penn Cent.,  U.S. at –.
190 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,  U.S. ,  ().
191 See id. at –.
192 See, e.g., Sterk, supra note , at – (finding that when the Supreme Court applies the
Penn Central test to a state or local regulation, the regulation is almost always sustained because of
federalism concerns, leaving such policing to the state courts); see also Krier & Sterk, supra note ,
at – (concluding that the Supreme Court most commonly delegates the responsibility for policing
regulatory abuses to state courts, who in turn tend to uphold the regulation as less than % of Penn
Central cases are successful); Basil H. Mattingly, Forum over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing
in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,  WILLAMETTE L. REV. , – () (finding in a study of
ninety-one federal cases that takings claims depended largely on the choice of forum, with landowners
having significantly more success in the Federal Court of Claims than other federal courts); cf. Daniel
A. Farber, Murr v. Wisconsin and the Future of Takings Law,  SUP. CT. REV. , – (criticizing
the Court’s endorsement of the multi-factor ad hoc approach of the Penn Central test).
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economic value. 193 The ubiquity of government regulations have made
expansive regulation “a background principle of property law,” which
makes it difficult to satisfy the Penn Central test. 194
D. The Limits Facing Temporary Takings
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Temporary takings represent another variant of partial taking. In
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 195 the Supreme Court held the federal
government’s physical possession of a commercial laundry facility for its
use during World War II constituted a compensable temporary taking. 196
However, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of temporary
regulatory takings until First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 197 which involved an interim county ordinance denying the
development of a church’s property after extreme flooding. 198 Although
the Court sidestepped the question of whether the ordinance at issue
constituted a taking, it recognized that temporary regulatory takings
require compensation, because “temporary takings [that] deny a
landowner all use of his property[] are not different in kind from
permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation.” 199
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra held that a
temporary, regulatory taking claim was not to be assessed based on the
Lucas per se takings rule, but rather under the Penn Central balancing
test. 200 The Supreme Court held that a thirty-two-month moratorium on
193

Pr

ep

rin

tn

ot

See Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to Clean Up
Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin,  N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY , – (); see also id. at –
(arguing that the Penn Central test fails to consider substantial private losses borne by landowners, and
therefore should be overruled, so that just compensation can be determined instead by the fair market
value of the rights taken as done for physical takings).
194 Farber, supra note , at .
195  U.S.  ().
196 Id. at  (determining that the proper compensation was the purported rental value of the
laundromat at the time the owner was displaced).
197  U.S.  ().
198 Id. at .
199 Id. at  (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego,
 U.S. ,  () (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States,
 U.S. , – () (using the logic of First English to hold that a temporary interference with
property can constitute a compensable taking).
200 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. , –,  ();
see also id. at  (explaining that while takings jurisprudence has typically endorsed the use of per se
rules for physical takings, partial regulatory takings continue to be examined via “ad hoc, factual
inquiries” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,  U.S. ,
 ())).
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development until a comprehensive zoning plan was in place supported a
strong public interest and was not unreasonable. 201 The Court concluded
that the moratorium did not deprive the affected properties of all
economic value or disrupt investment-backed expectations, because it
assumed that the undeveloped property would “recover [its] value as soon
as the prohibition is lifted.” 202
The key aspect of the Tahoe-Sierra decision was the Court’s defining
Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” to include the entire life of the property,
rather than the entire scope of the property for a period of time. 203 The
Court noted that “[i]n rejecting petitioners’ per se rule, we do not hold that
the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it
effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive
significance one way or the other.”204 The Supreme Court also expressed
concern that allowing temporary deprivations of economic use to
constitute a categorical taking would impose unreasonable financial
burdens upon governments for delays and lead to hasty decisionmaking. 205 Tahoe-Sierra’s focus on the lifetime value of the property makes
it difficult to establish temporary takings claims. 206 However, the decision
implies that it is possible for litigants to frame temporary regulations as
unreasonable burdens which constitute takings.
Exceptions to Temporary, Regulatory Takings

E.

1.

ot

Exceptions to takings provide state governments with additional
insulation from temporary, regulatory takings claims. These exceptions
do not give governments absolute immunity, but they present hurdles to
constructing viable temporary, regulatory takings claims.
Public Necessity/Emergency Takings Exception

tn

The common law defense of “public necessity” empowers
governments to exercise broad decision-making authority during
201

Id. at .
Id. at  (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon,  U.S. ,  n. ()).
203 Id. at –.
204 Id. at .
205 Id. at ; see also Laurel A. Firestone, Temporary Moratoria and Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence After Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. , – () (discussing the impact of Tahoe-Sierra on takings law).
206 See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States,  Fed. Cl. , ,  () (rejecting a takings
claim based on an agency’s forty-five-month delay in deciding about whether to allow drilling near a
nuclear site); Leon Cnty. v. Gluesenkamp,  So. d , – (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. ) (holding
that a temporary injunction on issuing building permits was not a regulatory taking).
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emergencies. The logic is that governments must be free to act swiftly and
decisively during times of crisis. This premise forms the basis for the
emergency exception defense to takings, which potentially justifies the
uncompensated destruction of real and personal property to protect the
lives and property of others. 207 The assertion of this defense requires the
government to show: (1) an actual emergency, (2) imminent danger, and
(3) the actual necessity of government action. 208 Although this emergency
exception is not found in the text of the Constitution, courts have applied
the emergency exception doctrine in a range of contexts. 209
Under the emergency exception doctrine, the Supreme Court has
recognized that “in times of imminent peril—such as when fire threatened
a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the
property of a few that the property of the many and the lives of many more
could be saved.”210 This doctrine of public necessity “absolve[s] the State
. . . of liability for the destruction of ‘real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent . . .’ or to forestall other grave threats to the
lives and property of others.” 211
The application of this exception has generally been limited to cases
involving the physical destruction of property without compensation
during emergencies and has not been applied to cases involving
regulations that do not literally destroy property. 212 Wartime cases
illuminate the application of this exception as it applies to physical
takings. For example, during World War II the U.S. Army ordered the
destruction of numerous U.S. facilities in Manila, Philippines, including a
Caltex petroleum depot supplying fuel, so that they would be of no use to
the invading Japanese army. 213 Caltex sued after the war for compensation,
but the Supreme Court held that this destruction of property during
wartime did not constitute a compensable taking. 214 The holding relied on
a similar Civil War case in which the U.S. Army destroyed a bridge to
impede the advances of the Confederacy. 215 The Court in that case held

207

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,  U.S. ,  n. ().
TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ).
209 See United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc.,  U.S. , ,  () (applying the emergency
exception to military operations); Bowditch v. Boston,  U.S. ,  () (applying the emergency
exception to city efforts to contain a fire).
210 Caltex,  U.S. at .
211 Lucas,  U.S. at  n. (quoting Bowditch,  U.S. at –).
212 Alexander Ronchetti, Burnt Lands, Dry Lakes, and Empty Pockets: Emergency Water Takings and
Wildfires,  ARIZ. ST. L.J. , – ().
213 Caltex,  U.S. at –.
214 Id. at .
215 United States v. Pacific R.R.,  U.S. ,  ().
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that “[t]he safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of
private loss” because the destruction was a military necessity. 216
Outside of wartime exceptions, the federal government’s power to
exercise eminent domain in emergencies is tempered by the need for just
compensation of affected property owners. 217 The President’s authority
during emergencies is limited by the scope of congressional statutory
authorization. 218 For example, the Public Health Service Act specifically
grants the President broad discretion and unilateral authority to declare
national health emergencies, 219 and the Defense Production Act
authorizes the President to expedite and expand the supply of materials
and services needed to address emergencies with just compensation for
the affected owners. 220 Under the Stafford Act, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (“FEMA”) is authorized to exercise eminent domain
during emergencies to seize personal and real property such as medicine,
food, and equipment with just compensation for the affected owners. 221
State governments, on the other hand, enjoy broader emergency
powers. 222 A state government may exercise police powers to regulate the
use of property to govern the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens
without paying just compensation, so long as it is “reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the [government’s] purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.” 223 For example, in Miller v. Schoene 224 the
Supreme Court upheld the state’s destruction of an orchard without
compensation because it was designed to prevent the spread of a disease
216
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Id. at ; see also Doe v. United States,  Fed. Cl. ,  () (holding that the U.S.
military’s occupation of an Iraqi citizen’s home during battle did not require compensation because it
fell within the “military necessity doctrine”).
217 See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,  U.S. , –
().
218 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,  U.S. , – () (holding that
President Truman did not have the authority to seize the nation’s steel mills during the Korean War
because there was neither an explicit congressional statute authorizing his decision, nor was it part of
his inherent powers).
219  U.S.C. § d. President Obama declared a public health emergency via the Public Health
Service Act during the  HN pandemic. Proclamation No. , Declaration of a National
Emergency With Respect to the  HN Influenza Pandemic,  Fed. Reg. , (Oct. , );
see also Joshua L. Friedman, Emergency Powers of the Executive: The President’s Authority When All Hell
Breaks Loose,  J.L. & HEALTH ,  () (arguing that the broad grant of executive authority
during public health emergencies is warranted).
220  U.S.C. §§ –.
221 See  U.S.C. § .
222 See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,  U.S. , – ().
223 Id. (quoting Lawton v. Steele,  U.S. ,  ()); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
U.S. ,  ().
224  U.S.  ().
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to adjacent orchards. 225 The Supreme Court recognized that the
destruction of the trees would ordinarily be a taking yet upheld “the
destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.” 226
The emergency takings doctrine has been extended to cases of
stopping crime227 and stopping the spread of fires. 228 The “conflagration
rule,” established in Bowditch v. Boston, 229 gives the government broad
immunity from takings liability when it destroys property to save other
property from fires. 230 Under this approach, governments have destroyed
buildings to prevent the spread of infection,231 burned vegetation that are
at risk of carrying airborne pathogens to other crops,232 and culled healthy
livestock to prevent the transmission of diseases. 233 The key dimension for
analyzing these claims is the urgency and necessity of the intervention.
The public necessity defense is satisfied if the government can show: (1)
225

Id. at .
Id.
227 See, e.g., Steele v. City of Houston,  S.W.d , ,  (Tex. ) (holding that the
police-led burning of the plaintiff’s home in an effort to capture escaped prisoners constituted an
emergency taking); Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.,  N.W.d , , – (Minn. )
(holding that property that was destroyed after a SWAT team shot tear gas and grenades into a house
to bring out suspects following a gun battle constituted a compensable taking under the Minnesota
Constitution).
228 See, e.g., Bowditch v. City of Boston,  U.S. , – () (holding that the destruction of
Bowditch’s building in order to stop the spread of a city fire did not require compensation based on
the common law of necessity); Am. Print Works v. Lawrence,  N.J.L. , – () (holding that
the city was justified in blowing up several warehouses to prevent the spread of a citywide fire based
on the right of necessity).
229  U.S.  ().
230 Id. at ; see also Jeremy Patashnik, The Trolley Problem of Climate Change: Should Governments
Face Takings Liability If Adaptive Strategies Cause Property Damage?,  COLUM. L. REV. , 
().
231 See Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,  U.S. ,  () (assessing claims against the U.S.
military’s destruction of several buildings to prevent the spread of yellow fever during the SpanishAmerican war).
232 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene,  U.S. ,  () (holding the destruction of infected trees
endangering local orchards as a valid state regulatory effort to protect crops); see also JOAN R.
CALLAHAN, EMERGING BIOLOGICAL THREATS: A REFERENCE GUIDE  () (discussing the burning
of  million citrus trees in Florida between  and  in an effort to stop a citrus canker
outbreak).
233 See, e.g., Stevenson Swanson, U.S. Seizes Sheep to Test for Mad Cow, CHIC. TRIB. (Mar. , ),
https://perma.cc/FRG-XGA (describing the federal seizure of  sheep in Vermont that were then
killed and tested to determine if they had mad cow disease); Mike Hughlett, Bird Flu Outbreak May
Persist for Several Years in Minnesota, Rest of U.S., STAR TRIB. (Apr. , , : PM),
https://perma.cc/SPV-ZVRW (describing millions of dollars in costs from destroying poultry as a
result of bird flu outbreak).
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an actual emergency, (2) an imminent danger, which is (3) met by a
response that is actually necessary. 234 The contours of an “actual necessity”
are unclear. 235 In some cases, state courts have determined government
destructions of private property to prevent disease outbreaks to be
compensable takings. 236
2.

Delay Exception to Temporary, Regulatory Takings
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Delays in government decisions also fall within an exception to
temporary, regulatory takings and are not independent grounds for valid
takings claims. The Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon 237 established
that “[m]ere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental
decision-making, absent extraordinary delay, are ‘incidents of
ownership.’” 238 Tahoe-Sierra made it clear that government delay is a factor
for consideration within the Penn Central analysis yet is not dispositive. 239
Tahoe-Sierra held a multiple-year delay in regulatory decision-making did
not constitute a taking, and subsequent decisions have held that absent
bad faith, government decision-making delays are not takings. 240

234

TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ).
Daniel H. Owsley, TrinCo and Actual Necessity: Has the Federal Circuit Provided the Tinder to
Burn Down the Public Necessity Defense in Wildfire Takings Cases?,  COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. ,
– () (arguing that this standard imposes a higher burden for the government to be absolved
from takings liability than intended).
236 See, e.g., Brewer v. State,  P.d ,  (Alaska ) (holding that the state was entitled
to use its police powers to prevent the spread of a wildfire by destroying private property without
compensation if the state can establish the existence of an imminent danger and an actual
emergency); Keyah Grande, LLC v. Colo. Dep’t of Agric.,  P.d ,  (Colo. App. ) (holding
that the Colorado Department of Agriculture’s destruction of an elk herder’s entire herd in order to
determine whether they had a fatal disease was a compensable taking); Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer
Servs. v. Polk,  So. d ,  (Fla. ) (holding that the Department of Agriculture’s destruction
of citrus trees to prevent a citrus canker outbreak was a compensable taking).
237  U.S.  ().
238 Id. at  n. (quoting Danforth v. United States,  U.S. ,  ()).
239 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. , – ().
240 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank,  U.S. , – () (holding
that an eight-year delay did not constitute a taking); Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States,  F.d
,  (Fed. Cir. ) (referring to Tahoe-Sierra for the notion that a multi-year governmental
delay, on its own, does not necessarily amount to a taking); Wyatt v. United States,  F.d  (Fed
Cir. ) (holding that a seven-year delay did not constitute a taking); see also Daniel L. Siegel, The
Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Temporary Regulatory Takings,  UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y , –
() (discussing state court treatment of this issue).
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The Shortcomings of Existing Takings Jurisprudence

1.

ev

Regulatory takings doctrines have not lived up to their constitutional
aspirations in providing protection for property owners. The muddled
frameworks of the Penn Central and Lucas tests, along with courts’ general
deference to state police powers, means that property owners face
significant difficulties in establishing regulatory takings. 241 The sweeping
use of power by state governors during the pandemic has raised the
question of whether takings law is striking the right balance between
economic liberty and state action. 242
The Denominator, Numerator, and Ripeness Problems.
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First, both Lucas total takings and Penn Central partial takings are
plagued by what is known as the “denominator problem.” Both categories
examine the diminution of value through a fraction: the decrease in value
due to a regulation divided by the property value absent the regulation.243
Property owners have the incentive to define the relevant property (the
denominator) narrowly in hopes of invoking the Lucas total takings rule.
In contrast, governments seek to define the owner’s property as broadly
as possible to include property not affected by the regulation. 244
The Penn Central test established the “whole parcel” rule, which
defines the denominator in takings cases as the entire, aggregated parcel
owned by the landowner over the entire period it was held by the owner—
a deferential approach to the state. 245 In Murr v. Wisconsin, 246 the Supreme
Court established a multi-factor test to discern whether the “reasonable
expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to
anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as
separate tracts.” 247 This approach has made it more difficult for affected
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241 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,  U.S. , – (); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City,  U.S. ,  ().
242 See Debra Kahn, Newsom Executive Orders Test Constitutional Bounds—And Legislative
Goodwill, POLITICO (Apr. , , : PM), https://perma.cc/VC-AWS.
243 Farber, supra note , at .
244 Id. at .
245 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Partial Takings,  COLUM. L. REV. , –
(); see also id. at  (proposing the creation of a voluntary option for owners of a partially
condemned lot to force the purchase of the remainder).
246  S. Ct.  ().
247 Id. at . Murr established three factors to consider in determining the denominator: “the
treatment of the land under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the land, and the
prospective value of the regulated land.” Id.
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owners to have courts focus only on the portion of their holdings affected
by a regulation. 248
Second, takings claims under the Lucas rule and Penn Central test also
face a numerator problem—how to determine the diminution of value of
the specific property interest subject to regulation. 249 Penn Central noted
that courts must consider the extent to which benefits outside the
regulated parcel might offset or mitigate the decline in value. 250 Similarly,
in Murr, the Court held that determining the numerator requires courts
to include the property’s potential “synergies with the owner’s other
holdings.”251
This numerator and denominator problem is particularly salient in
the context of business shutdowns as some operations of a business in one
part of the country may be completely shut down while others remain
open. Think of a hypothetical Disney parks takings challenge. The state of
California shuttered Disney Land from March 2020 to April 2021, while
Disney World in Florida resumed operations starting in September
2020. 252 Analyzing the impact of the Disney Land shutdown separately
would lead to different conclusions than analyzing the shutdown in the
context of Disney’s world-wide theme parks or overall media operations,
which continued throughout the pandemic.
Third, parties face the challenge of determining when a temporary,
regulatory taking claim is ripe. 253 Knick v. Township of Scott, 254 held that a
landowner may bring a takings claim in federal court at the time the
government takes his property without paying for it. 255 On the one hand,
this calculation appears easy as the window for a potential taking is the
time between (a) when a regulation shutting down or substantially
limiting business operations begins, and (b) when the regulation at issue
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See Epstein, supra note , at – (concluding that Murr never addressed the question of
why the fair market value of the rights taken cannot be applied to compensation determinations in
regulatory takings); see also Farber, supra note , at  (noting the Murr court’s failure to criticize or
refine the Penn Central test).
249 See Farber, supra note , at .
250 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  ().
251 Farber, supra note , at .
252 Julie Tremaine, Disney World Can Resume ‘Normal Operations,’ But Won’t Yet—Here’s What That
Means, FORBES (Sept. , , : AM), https://perma.cc/FFM-FHA.
253 See Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts,  VAND. L. REV. ,
– () (arguing that the ripeness doctrine delays the litigation process and makes it difficult for
takings cases to be heard in federal court); see also Sterk, supra note , at – (noting that in
applying the ripeness doctrine, federal courts have often found takings claims unripe, therefore
reducing the role of federal courts in adjudicating takings cases).
254  S. Ct.  ().
255 Id. at .
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is lifted. But what is difficult is determining when the regulation blossoms
into a taking. That may ultimately require proof of a financial impact,
which takes time to accrue and will understandably vary based on the
nature of the business. In Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank 256:

2.

Timing Issues with Temporary Takings

ev

[T]he Court explained the requirement that a takings claim must be ripe. The Court held
that a takings claim challenging the application of land-use regulations is not ripe unless
“the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” 257
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Another set of challenges facing regulatory takings claims are the
ambiguities surrounding temporary takings claims. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Tahoe-Sierra deviated from conventional understandings of
the temporal aspects of property law in a way that make temporary takings
claims difficult to establish. Traditionally in real property law, property is
conceived as a bundle of sticks with temporal rights forming slices of the
property interests that owners can use or sell. 258 The classic illustration is
a lease, a time-bound interest in a property that vests use rights in the
lessee for the duration of the lease. 259
In contrast, in Tahoe-Sierra the Supreme Court abandoned this basic
premise of property law and refused to separate a parcel’s value into
temporal slices to measure whether the property had been deprived of all
economic use for the temporary period at issue. 260 Instead, the Supreme
Court concluded that the “parcel as a whole” analysis 261 requires an
assessment of the “geographic dimensions” and the “temporal aspects of

256

 U.S.  ().
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,  U.S. ,  () (citation omitted) (quoting Williamson
Cnty.,  U.S. at ); accord Williamson Cnty.,  U.S. at –.
258 E.g., Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. ,  ().
259 J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property,  UCLA L. REV. ,  ().
260 See Firestone, supra note , at –.
261 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. , – (). This is essentially the
same as the “denominator problem” that permanent takings face. See Laura J. Powell, The Parcel as a
Whole: Defining the Relevant Parcel in Temporary Regulatory Takings Cases,  WASH. L. REV.  ()
(criticizing the “whole parcel” rule in temporary takings and arguing that parcels should be measured
by owners’ investment in properties in line with principles of fairness and justice).
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the owner’s interests. 262 Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X)263
captured this holding’s impact by concluding that the relevant parcel in
temporary regulatory takings claims is valued over the property’s “entire
useful life.” 264 In theory, this approach would preclude any temporary
takings claim caused by regulations, so long as regulators could claim that
the regulation was not permanent.
Tahoe-Sierra’s interpretation of how to analyze the “parcel as a
whole” 265 leads to odd inconsistencies. For example, a lessee could have a
plausible takings claim if the only interest the lessee possesses is the lease,
and the regulation at issue interrupted the lessee’s use of the property for
the term of the lease. In contrast, a property owner who has fee simple
title of a property would not be able to make a temporary, regulatory
taking claim because of the focus on the lifetime value. The context of
pandemic claims offers courts a chance to revisit this inconsistency and to
restore the more conventional property law understanding that a fee
simple owner can have multiple, severable interests in a property, some of
which may be affected by a temporary regulation.
Another issue surrounding temporary, regulatory takings the
Supreme Court has yet to address is the determination of when such a
taking begins and ends. 266 State courts, which generally rely upon state
constitutions, statutes, and case law, provide varying, and thus limited
guidance to federal courts regarding this issue. 267 This point matters
because the economic impact of a temporary regulation may not neatly fit
the parameters of the day of implementation of a regulation and the day
of its revocation or sunset. For example, businesses that faced shutdown
orders may have had revenue from pre-pandemic transactions or accounts
receivable coming in for weeks after the shutdown that would create the
appearance of continued partial profitability and undercut potential
takings claims. But as the shutdown wore on the absence of subsequent
transactions would raise the question as to whether takings claims should
count the full window of the regulation’s applicability or merely the period
in which the regulation stripped or dramatically decreased profitability.
For ease of administrative convenience, a takings claim should be treated
as covering the time frame of the temporary regulation’s entire
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262 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. , – () (“[A]
fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because
the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”).
263  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
264 Id. at –.
265 Tahoe-Sierra,  U.S. at –.
266 See Gregory M. Stein, Pinpointing the Beginning and Ending of a Temporary Regulatory Taking,
 WASH. L. REV. , – ().
267 Id. at .
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application, not merely starting when the business actually experienced
the economic effects. Companies could document the extent to which
revenues stem from the period prior to the regulation’s implementation
to reflect a more accurate picture of lost profits. 268
3.

The Shortcomings of Takings Law as it Relates to State Police
Power
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But the most significant shortcoming of takings law is the failure to
address the intersection of takings law and police power. The result has
been a frequent conflation of police power and takings law which has led
to the development of large exceptions to takings compensation in the
name of emergencies or public necessity. 269 Prior to Penn Central, state
police power was analyzed through the lens of the substantive due process
doctrine, which was distinct from takings doctrine and had roots back to
the Lochner era of judicial skepticism of regulatory burdens on property.270
By integrating Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause precedents to create a unified takings
doctrine, Penn Central eliminated due process as a distinctive category of
inquiry in takings law and the states’ police power defense. 271 Instead of
first figuring out what the claimant’s property rights actually are based on
state law and analyzing those rights in light of the scope of the state’s
police powers, courts after Penn Central directly applied takings doctrines
to analyze the merits of takings claims. 272
The downside of this approach is that courts have failed to recognize
and delineate the overlap of state police powers and the need for just
compensation under takings law. The issue is not about imposing limits
on the vast state police powers, but rather recognizing that takings law
does provide for just compensation when the few take on burdens for the
sake of the health, welfare, and safety of the many.
Another way of framing the issue is that the “character of the
government action” prong of the Penn Central test says very little about
whether a takings occurs. That is an artifact of substantive due process
analysis, but the fact that a regulation is part of the state’s police powers
does not help to reveal whether (or at what point) the regulatory burden
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268 See id. at – (arguing that temporary takings claims in the real property context should
begin at the time a variance is rejected and end at the point when the regulation is withdrawn).
269 Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the
Takings “Muddle”,  MINN. L. REV. , – ().
270 Id. –.
271 Id. at –.
272 Id. at , –.
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encroaches on private property rights under takings law. 273 The ultimate
question is the extent of the economic burden of a regulation on private
property, 274 and whether that burden rises to the level of being a functional
equivalent of a full or partial government seizure of that property to
advance a public purpose. 275 That is the foundational question at the heart
of the pandemic takings cases.
The Challenge of Just Compensation Calculations for
Businesses

ev

4.

The Asset-Based Approach
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One of the challenges of implementing temporary, regulatory takings
is determining which framework would not only be consistent with just
compensation but also could be administered cost effectively. Courts
typically apply one of three approaches to approximate the market value
of a business subjected to a takings: an asset-based approach, a sales
comparison approach, or an income approach. 276 Each of these
frameworks has limitations in the context of comprehensive takings of
businesses, but these approaches are particularly difficult to apply in the
context of temporary, regulatory takings.
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The asset-based approach to business valuation assesses the pretakings value of each asset and liability of a business to determine the
overall fair market value. 277 An appraiser or other court-appointed party
analyzes the business’s financial statements to determine the value of the
equipment, land, or other assets, while taking into account any
depreciation expenses and the business’s liabilities. 278 The primary critique
of this approach is that it assesses individual parts of a business while
273
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See D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause,  U. MIAMI L. REV. , –
,  () (arguing that a taking should only be found where an exercise of the police power has
rendered the property valueless).
274 Id. at –.
275 See Danaya C. Wright, A Requiem for Regulatory Takings: Reclaiming Eminent Domain for
Constitutional Property Claims,  ENVTL. L. , –, – ().
276 Rick Robertson & Kevin T. Segler, Pitfalls and Problems with Entities Created During Marriage,
in  ADVANCED FAMILY LAW, ch. , pt.  (State Bar of Tex. ed., ).
277 Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation,  DEL. J. CORP. L. , – ().
278 See Robert F. Reilly, What Lawyers Need to Know About the Asset-Based Approach to Business
Valuation (Part I), PRAC. LAW., Oct. , at , – (explaining conventional GAAP-based
accounting focuses on tangible assets and liabilities, while the asset-based approach recognizes the
current value of the company’s tangible and intangible assets, such as tax or litigations claims, and the
company’s recorded and contingent liabilities).
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ignoring the “going concern value” and human capital that is generating
income, which may dramatically undervalue service businesses. 279
The challenge of applying an asset-based approach to temporary,
regulatory takings is that it would be difficult and administratively
expensive to approximate the changes in a business’s assets and liabilities
due to government shutdowns. In many cases, the value of assets would
be depressed during the government action but would recover quickly
once the government action has passed. Think of travel-related businesses
whose asset values would have plummeted amidst the pandemic
shutdowns, but the asset values of these types of businesses often
recovered quickly once restrictions were lifted. Depending on when the
snapshot of asset and liabilities changes is taken, courts may over- or
under-compensate under this approach. Courts may therefore end up
missing the actual economic impact of the government action that cannot
be remedied following the lifting of the restrictions.
b. The Sales Comparison Approach
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The limitations of the asset-based approach may lead courts to
consider applying a sales comparison framework to assess a business’s
value. 280 Under the sales comparison approach, an appraiser seeks to
identify comparable businesses, assess the fair market value of those
businesses, and make additions or deductions that reflect differences
between the basket of comparable businesses versus the business that has
been subjected to takings. This framework mirrors what an appraiser does
in valuing real estate property for takings claims (or conventional
appraisals for mortgages). The difference is that real estate properties are
readily comparable because of the recording system of real property sales,
which allows appraisers efficiently to gather and analyze baskets of recent
real property sales with similar dimensions in similar areas. 281
The sales comparison approach may be plausible for publicly traded
companies because of transparency requirements concerning recent sales
and comparable data points such as price-to-earnings ratios, price-to-
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279 “Going concern value” is the economic value associated with a business’s likely continued
operation into the future, considering the company’s assets and liabilities. See, e.g., Lacoste v. Lacoste,
 So. d ,  (Miss. Ct. App. ) (discussing how the asset-based approach may dramatically
understate the value of service businesses whose revenue generation is primarily a function of their
assets and liabilities).
280 See Jan K. Guben, William J. Ahern, Jr., John B. Descamp, Jr., James F. Gossett, Michael Handler
& James M. Kalashian, Realistic Appraisal Techniques of Large Income-Producing Properties,  REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. ,  ().
281 See Richard J. Maloney, Valuation, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DIVORCE IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
§ .. (Jeanmarie Papelian ed., ).
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book value, and price-to-revenue ratios. In contrast, appraisers may face
difficulty in identifying comparable data for private businesses, since
there is no comparable, systematic disclosures of recent sales of private
companies. Even to the extent data on past sales of private companies is
available, the absence of broader private company financial disclosures
would create difficulties (and tremendous expense) for appraisers. Any
financial or operational data about private companies would be selfreported and selective at best, which would make it challenging for
appraisers to identify similarities and differences across companies that
may require adjustments to the comparable sales. Because of these
problems, comparable sales analyses for private companies would be
expensive and time-consuming and would have limited informational
value. 282
The shortcomings of the sales comparison approach are even clearer
in the context of temporary, regulatory takings. Sales that took place
during the pandemic shutdowns would likely entail artificially depressed
prices. Using “fire sale” prices as benchmarks for comparable sales data
may systematically understate the value of companies that were able to
continue as freestanding, going concerns throughout the pandemic and
overstate the claims for compensation. The “snapshot problem” would
come up again as the value of the businesses would oscillate throughout
the pandemic shutdowns. Focusing on temporary declines in value would
likely miss the lasting economic impact of the shutdowns which is lost
revenue and profits, which in many cases, such as for restaurants or hotels,
could not be recovered in the future.
At best, the sales comparison approach would be useful for estimating
compensation for businesses that were bankrupted by the pandemic
shutdowns. Appraisers could use pre-pandemic sales data for comparable
businesses as benchmarks for approximating the economic impact of the
shutdowns and then factor in the similarities and differences among these
businesses.
c.

Income Approach

rin

The asset-based and sales-comparison approaches both have intrinsic
limitations in the business context, which makes an income approach a
more appealing alternative for business takings claims. 283 Income
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282 See, e.g., State of La., DOTD, v. McKeithen,  So. d ,  (La. Ct. App. ) (holding
that a comparable sales approach could not be applied as a stand-alone measure for determining the
value of a private, specialty gin-producing business as there were too many differences similar ginproducing companies).
283 See Guben et al., supra note , at .
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approach analysis seeks to convert the future predicted economic benefits
(i.e., earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) into
present value terms. The simple logic is that a business’s value is a function
of its stream of earnings adjusted for its present value or capitalization
rate. This approach makes sense to the extent that the past is prologue
(i.e., that past earnings can be projected into the future), which obviously
rests on a set of assumptions about both the affected business and the
broader economy.
Courts typically apply one of two lenses for income analysis of an
affected business: the discounted cash flow or the capitalization of
earnings method. The discounted cash flow method entails an appraiser
using historical earnings and expenses to project a business’s estimated
future cash flows, typically over a five-year window. 284 Then the appraiser
adjusts the cash flow estimates to reflect their present value by applying a
discount rate based on the risks related to the business (such as market
risk and inflation). 285 The capitalization of earnings method entails an
appraisers’ projecting historical earnings and expenses into expected
future cash flows and dividing the projected cash flows by a capitalization
rate (which is a function of the estimated rate of return of comparable
businesses and the business’s projected long-term growth). 286
These approaches are most useful in assessing just compensation for
real estate takings, a context in which cash flows are generally predictable
and discount and capitalization rates for categories of real estate can be
readily estimated. The primary shortcoming of the income approach is the
complexity and speculative nature of the assumptions incorporated into
the discount and capitalization rates especially in non-real estate contexts
in which there may greater subjectivity in identifying risks and rates of
return for the industry at issue. 287 For example, discount and capitalization
rates may end up in battles of experts for the government and affected
businesses who each make different subjective assessments of the extent
of future market risk, the extent of future inflation, and the rate of return
for comparable businesses. 288 In the context of temporary, regulatory
takings the focus is not on the overall value of a business, but rather on
the financial impact from government action that cannot be recovered in
the future.
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284 See Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems: Reflections on the Delaware Appraisal
Proceeding,  AM. BUS. L.J. , ,  ().
285 Id. at .
286 Courtney E. Beebe, Note, The Object of My Appraisal: Idaho’s Approach to Valuing Goodwill as
Community Property in Chandler v. Chandler,  IDAHO L. REV. , – ().
287 See Michael Bilby, Business Valuation Methods: Pros and Cons for Business Owners, CONCANNON
MILLER: THOUGHT BLOG (July , ), https://perma.cc/EC-VZXZ.
288 AM. INST. OF REAL EST. APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE – (th ed. ).
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The Limited Case Law on Frameworks for Temporary,
Regulatory Takings
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In spite of the existence of these frameworks for takings
compensation, the Supreme Court has focused on market rate rentals or
business losses in the limited number of cases in which it has considered
temporary takings compensation. 289 The Supreme Court has held that
“[o]rdinarily fair compensation for a temporary [government] possession
of a business enterprise is the reasonable value of the property’s use.”290
“[T]he proper measure of compensation [for a temporary, physical taking]
is the rental that probably could have been obtained” for a business, 291
which is based in part on “the record of its past earnings.” 292 In other
words, the government owes business or property owners market level
rent for physically occupying businesses or property, such as for wartime
production.
In contrast, in the handful of cases in which the Supreme Court has
considered compensation for temporary, regulatory takings, the Court
has applied other lenses for compensation that focus on business losses. 293
For example, in United States v Pewee Coal Co.,294 the Supreme Court
analyzed takings compensation in the context of a federal government
requirement that coal mines continue operating for five-and-a-half
months to prevent a strike from disrupting wartime production. 295 Justice
Reed, in a concurrence, concluded that “[m]arket value, despite its
difficulties, provides a fairly acceptable test for just compensation when
the property is taken absolutely. But in the temporary taking of operating
properties, market value is too uncertain a measure to have any practical
significance.”296 This approach effectively dismissed the relevance of the
asset-based and comparable sale lenses for temporary, regulatory takings
compensation. Instead, the Court concluded that under the Takings
Clause, the government’s mandate for the continued operation of Pewee
Coal’s mines “require[d] the United States to bear operating losses

289

See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co.,  U.S.  ().
Id. at  (first citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,  U.S.  (); and then citing
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.,  U.S.  ()).
291 Kimball Laundry,  U.S. at .
292 Id. at .
293 See Pewee Coal,  U.S. at –.
294  U.S.  ().
295 Id. at –.
296 Id. at – (Reed, J., concurring).

Pr

ep

290

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4005552

iew
ed

George Mason Law Review

124

[Vol. 29:1

incurred during the period the Government operates private property in
the name of the public without the owner’s consent.” 297
More recently, the Federal Circuit in the Cienega line of cases sought
to limit the focus on business losses to physical takings, while focusing on
the impairment of net income in temporary, regulatory takings cases. 298
The Federal Circuit proposed two ways to assess temporary, regulatory
takings:

ev

First, a comparison could be made between the market value of the property with and
without the restrictions on the date that the restriction began (the change in value approach). The other approach is to compare the lost net income due to the restriction (discounted to present value at the date the restriction was imposed) with the total net income without the restriction over the entire useful life of the property (again discounted
to present value). 299
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Although the Supreme Court has not officially embraced the Federal
Circuit’s lost net income approach, as Part IV argues, a net profits (net
income) approach may balance compensation for affected businesses
while mitigating the risks of moral hazard that may arise from market
rental or loss approaches laid out in earlier Supreme Court cases.
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III. The Failures of Pandemic Takings Claims
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This Part surveys the takings challenges that occurred during the
pandemic. Most of them were unsuccessful, primarily due to the broad
deference given by courts to government action during emergencies.

297

Id. at  (majority opinion).
See Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X),  F.d , – (Fed. Cir. ).
299 Id. at .
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Numerous businesses—from salons, 300 to restaurants, 301 dance
studios, 302 landlords, 303 gyms, 304 day care centers,305 and class action
participants 306—have sued state governors claiming that the shutdowns
constitute a compensable regulatory taking. Along with these allegations,
some plaintiffs have specifically pointed to the arbitrariness of the
“essential” business designations and the discriminatory nature of the
executive orders to raise a range of claims. For example, in Antietam
Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 307 Maryland businesses and individuals argued
that Governor Hogan’s executive orders not only constituted a
compensatory taking under the Fifth Amendment, but also infringed on
their First Amendment rights to free speech and peaceful assembly,
violated the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily treating them
differently from other similar kinds of businesses, and violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. 308
In Schulmerich Bells, LLC v. Wolf,309 Pennsylvania businesses brought a class
action challenging their governor’s shutdowns, arguing that the orders violated
the Takings Clause, and both substantive and procedural due process rights
because the order deprived them of their property rights arbitrarily.310 In Gondola
Adventures, Inc. v. Newsom,311 plaintiffs alleged in part that the Governor’s orders
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300 See Pro. Beauty Fed’n of Cal. v. Newsom, No. :-cv-,  WL  (C.D. Cal. June
, ); Katy Grimes, California Salon Owners and Barbers Sue Gov. Newsom over the Right to Earn a Living, CAL.
GLOBE (May , , : PM), https://perma.cc/KRS-KWJC.
301 See Amato v. Elicker,  F. Supp. d  (D. Conn. ); see also Thomas Breen, Judge Upholds
Emergency Orders, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (May , , : AM), https://perma.cc/YC-LJC.
302 See, e.g., Complaint, State v. Lake Cnty. Health Comm’r, No. CV (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
June , ); see also Joe Pagonakis, Local Dance Studio Owners Part of COVID- Lawsuit Against
Ohio, NEWS  CLEVELAND (June , , : PM), https://perma.cc/KY-LHN.
303 See Complaint, Behar v. Murphy, No. :-cv- (D.N.J. Apr. , ).
304 See Laura Albanese, Gyms, Still Shut, Are Part of a Class-Action Lawsuit Against NYS, NEWSDAY
(July , , : PM), https://perma.cc/PSP-CNUD.
305 See Complaint, Kaiser Daycare Inc. v. Himes, No. -CV- (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June ,
); Madeline Mitchell, Ohio Day Cares Sue Dr. Amy Action, Lance Himes over Coronavirus Pandemic
Regulations, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June , , : PM), https://perma.cc/XQF-MFY.
306 See Gondola Adventures, Inc. v. Newsom, No. :-cv-,  WL  (C.D. Cal. Apr. ,
); Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan,  F. Supp. d  (D. Md. ); see also Steve Lash, Federal
Judge Rejects Challenge to Hogan’s Stay-at-Home Orders, DAILY REC. (May , ), https://perma.cc/YC-SP.
307  F. Supp. d  (D. Md. ).
308 See id. at –; see also SH Health Consulting, LLC v. Page,  F. Supp. d  (E.D. Mo.
) (noting the plaintiff’s arguments that the shutdowns violated due process rights and the right to assemble).
309 Complaint, Schulmerich Bells, LLC v. Wolf, No. :-cv- (E.D. Pa. Mar. , ).
310 See id. at –.
311 Complaint, Gondola Adventures, No. :-cv- (C.D. Cal. Apr. , ).
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amounted to a partial or complete taking in violation of the Takings Clause
because the total shutdown of “non-essential” businesses was “an irrational,
arbitrary, and capricious law bearing no rational basis to any valid government
interest.”312
These secondary claims reflect creative “kitchen sink” lawyering,
which is unlikely to gain judicial traction. But the premise of the
arguments highlights the appeal of the potential regulatory takings
claims, which are rooted in the extent of the economic burden “nonessential” businesses faced during the shutdowns and the glaring lack of
uniformity of categorizing businesses as “essential” and “non-essential.”
Some businesses were singled out to bear burdens for the public good,
while others gained windfalls from being able to remain open and facing
artificially reduced competition. The nature of these selective shutdowns
and their duration is markedly different than the conventional exercise of
police powers during hurricanes or floods, which have finite temporal
impact and comprehensive scope for the affected areas.
B. The Challenges Facing Takings Claims
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Courts have broadly conflated the legality of the exercise of state
police powers with the invalidity of pandemic takings claims and, with few
exceptions, have failed to distinguish between these two separate
questions. 313 Michigan Nursery & Landscape Association v. Whitmer 314 is a
notable exception that found executive orders may have gone too far. 315 In
this case, an association of landscapers and garden suppliers sued
Michigan’s governor for prohibiting the operation of businesses that
require workers to leave their homes. 316 The plaintiffs argued that the stayat-home order violated the Takings Clause and was unreasonable because
it placed an undue burden on commerce while offering little benefit, since
gardening and landscaping work could be done safely outdoors.317
Although the court did not grant the Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary
restraining order, it acknowledged that, “[p]laintiffs have a point that lawn
care can largely be performed alone or while maintaining an appropriate
social distance.” 318 Two days later, the lawsuit was mooted when Governor

312

Id. at .
See infra Section III.C.
314 No. :-cv-,  WL  (W.D. Mich. Apr. , ).
315 See id. at *.
316 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion of Preliminary Injunction at
–, Mich. Nursery & Landscape Ass’n, No. :-cv- (W.D. Mich. Apr. , ).
317 See id. at –.
318 Mich. Nursery & Landscape Ass’n,  WL , at *.
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Whitmer modified her order to allow landscapers and gardeners to
resume business operations. 319 Other lawsuits alleging unlawful
infringements on the right to travel 320 and state officials’ violations of
statutory authority 321 have seen some limited success.
Takings claims, however, remain largely unsuccessful as courts
continue to defer to government actions. 322 In McCarthy v. Cuomo,323 the
owner of a gentleman’s club that also operated as a restaurant and bar sued
Governor Cuomo, alleging that the shutdowns violated the Takings
Clause. 324 The court, however, reasoned that the shutdowns did not deny
McCarthy all economically beneficial use of his property, because he had
the option of operating food and drink take-out or delivery services and
therefore could not meet the Lucas total takings test. 325 The court also held
the plaintiff would fail the Penn Central test because of the failure to
mitigate damages by having street-side food and drink take-out and
delivery services. 326
The most significant takings case during the pandemic has been
Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf,327 in which businesses challenged the
Pennsylvania governor’s mandated shutdowns of all “non-life-sustaining”
businesses, alleging that the Order exceeded the governor’s statutory
authority, and violated the Takings Clause, procedural due process rights,
the Equal Protection Clause, and the right to assembly. 328 The plaintiffs
argued that because the Order completely prohibited them from using
their property, it constituted a taking of private property for public use. 329
319

See Mich. Exec. Order No. - (Apr. , ), https://perma.cc/ZLT-WW.
See, e.g., Roberts v. Neace,  F. Supp. d , , – (E.D. Ky.) (enjoining a temporary stayat-home order because it violated the right to travel and was overly vague), aff’d,  F.d  (th Cir. );
Complaint at –, Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Whitmer, No. :-cv- (W.D. Mich. Apr. , )
(arguing that the Michigan Governor’s orders prohibiting the use of motorized boating violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it singled out boating and arbitrarily infringed on the right to travel).
321 See Wis. Legislature v. Palm,  N.W.d , – (Wis. ) (holding that the Secretary-designee of
the Department of Health Services had exceeded her statutory authority in extending a stay-at-home order
indefinitely).
322 See, e.g., Metroflex Oceanside LLC v. Newsom, -CV-,  WL , at * (S.D. Cal.
Apr. , ); Leb. Valley Auto Racing Corp. v. Cuomo,  F. Supp. d , – (N.D.N.Y. );
Auracle Homes, LLC v. Lamont,  F. Supp. d , – (D. Conn. ).
323 No. -cv-,  WL  (E.D.N.Y. June , ).
324 Id. at *–; see also Larry Celona & Tamar Lapin, Long Island Strip Club Owner Sues Gov. Andrew
Cuomo over Business Closures, N.Y. POST (May , , : PM), https://perma.cc/QQU-PDAX.
325 See McCarthy,  WL , at *.
326 Id.
327  A.d  (Pa.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ().
328 Id. at ; see also Mark Chenoweth, When the Wolf at the Door Is Your Governor, FORBES (July , ,
: AM), https://perma.cc/BSA-RJL.
329 Friends of Danny DeVito,  A.d at .
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The plaintiffs also pointed out the enormous economic damage created
by the shutdowns, argued that the determination of “life-sustaining” and
“non-life sustaining” businesses was arbitrary and vague, and asserted
their businesses could operate safely within social distancing guidelines. 330
Relying on Tahoe-Sierra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
regulatory taking had not occurred because the shutdowns only resulted
in a temporary loss of the plaintiffs’ business operations and were within
the state’s police powers. 331 The court concluded that the shutdowns were
temporary because even though the duration of the pandemic was
unknown, the search for a vaccine was certain, and immunity and testing
were present. 332 In terms of due process, the court found that businesses
classified as non-life-sustaining could technically petition for
reclassification, and therefore their due process rights were not violated
by the shutdowns. 333 The court held that there was no violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because the plaintiffs’ businesses were
fundamentally different from other businesses that were allowed to stay
open. 334 Similarly, the court concluded that the right to assembly was not
impeded either, because Plaintiffs could communicate via phone or
videoconference. 335
In TJM , Inc. v. Harris, 336 the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee denied the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary
restraining order against local shutdown orders. 337 Plaintiffs alleged that
the mandated shutdown of licensed restaurants was a violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and a taking under the Fifth
Amendment. 338 The court found no violation of either. 339 The court held
that the restaurants were not deprived of all economically beneficial uses
Id. at , –.
Id. at  (“In so holding, the [Tahoe-Sierra] Court stated that ‘the extreme categorical rule
that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely
cannot be sustained,’ as it would apply to numerous ‘normal delays . . . [that] have long been
considered permissible exercises of the police power,’ which do not entitle the individuals affected to
compensation.” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. 
())).
332 Id. at –.
333 See id. at .
334 See id. at .
335 Friends of Danny DeVito,  A.d at . The plaintiff’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was
denied. Friends of Danny DeVito,  S. Ct.  (); see also Nicholas Malfitano, U.S. Supreme Court
Rejects Businesses’ Challenge of Gov. Wolf’s Coronavirus Shutdowns, PA. REC. (May , ),
https://perma.cc/YKB-LKJ.
336 TJM , Inc. v. Harris,  F. Supp. d  (W.D. Tenn. ).
337 Id. at .
338 Id. at –.
339 Id. at , .
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of their properties because they voluntarily chose not to pursue
alternative means of revenue. 340 Second, the court applied the Penn
Central test and found that while both the economic impact and
investment-backed expectations factors definitely favored the plaintiffs,
the character of the government action did not. 341 The court framed the
tension between a public taking and a valid exercise of state police power
as a mutually exclusive choice, ultimately finding the shutdown orders
were within the broad police powers of the state which invalidated the
takings claim. 342 The court supported its holding with functional
arguments that granting takings compensation would strain judicial and
government resources and excessively restrict the broad police powers of
the state. 343
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C. Common Themes from Pandemic Takings Cases
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The rejection of an array of pandemic-related takings cases raises
further issues for thinking about how to construct a framework for future
economic liberty takings claims. First, courts factor in whether plaintiffs
had alternative means of making revenue. 344 To the extent that affected
businesses chose not to pursue those alternatives, even if the revenue
possibilities appear de minimis, courts appear reluctant to find a
categorical taking under the Lucas test. 345 This approach would make it
difficult for any regulatory taking to be recognized as illustrated by the
McCarthy court’s farcical recommendation for strippers to sell sodas in
front of their shuttered establishment. 346 It is akin to asking a landowner
facing a prohibition on building a beach house to rent out the landowner’s
strip of sand to day beach visitors. Even if it is technically possible for an
affected property owner to change the economic aspirations for the
property to low revenue uses, holding that this possibility removes a
potential claim of deprivation of all economically beneficial uses begs
credulity.
Second, courts have routinely focused on the temporary nature of the
pandemic and the shutdowns as a conclusory factor in their takings
analysis, in spite of the fact that the pandemic’s uncertainties and
potential vaccine-resistant mutations make the duration of the crisis
340
341
342
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Id. at .
Id. at –.
TJM ,  F. Supp. d at .
See id. at .
See, e.g., id. at –.
See id. at  (“Plaintiffs have not shown that their properties have lost all economic value.”).
See McCarthy v. Cuomo, No. -cv-,  WL , at * (E.D.N.Y. June , ).
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open-ended. For example, in Friends of Danny DeVito, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded there was no takings claim due to the
temporary nature of the shutdowns and did not even apply the Penn
Central test. 347 Even when the Penn Central test is applied, courts may find
that the emergency character of the shutdown orders outweighs the
enormous economic damage and shattered investment-backed
expectations imposed onto the plaintiffs. 348 By incorporating notions of
police power into the “character of the government action” factor, courts
seem to put the emergency nature of the pandemic and the broad scope
of state police powers above all else. 349 In doing so, courts conflate the
legality of the exercise of state police powers with takings protections and
fail to analyze the substance of state encroachments on the economic
liberty of businesses.
These cases demonstrate the reluctance of courts to second-guess
government-mandated shutdowns imposed for the sake of public
health. 350 However, courts continue to analyze and scrutinize cases within
constitutional limits. 351 If state officials exceed their statutory authority352
or force the closure of select businesses unreasonably, 353 plaintiffs may
find support for a compensable taking. More importantly, the Supreme
Court has not had the opportunity to revisit the ad hoc doctrines that it
has constructed around temporary, regulatory takings and to analyze the
implications of state and lower court decisions on pandemic-related
claims. The extraordinary scope and impact of the shutdowns may cause
the Supreme Court or state legislatures to revisit takings doctrines and
reconsider the need for state actors to internalize the costs of state action
on businesses.

Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf,  A.d , – (Pa.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ().
See, e.g., TJM ,  F. Supp. d at –.
349 See id. at ,  (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  ()).
350 This is especially true in light of the Jacobson test. See, e.g., Amato v. Elicker,  F. Supp. d
,  (D. Conn. ) (denying plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order by referring to
the Jacobson test, which “requires that courts refrain from second-guessing state governments’
response unless there is ‘no real or substantial relation’ between the actions and the public health and
safety or the action is ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights’” (quoting Jacobson v.
Massachusetts,  U.S. ,  ())); Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown,  P.d ,  (Or. )
(holding that the Governor’s executive orders were not subject to a statutory -day time limit because
of the emergency situation of the pandemic).
351 See, e.g., Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (holding
that a Church’s allegations that a shutdown order prohibiting mass gatherings was in violation of the
First Amendment and state law would likely succeed on the merits).
352 See Wis. Legislature v. Palm,  N.W.d  (Wis. ).
353 See Mich. Nursery & Landscape Ass’n v. Whitmer, No. :-cv-,  WL  (W.D.
Mich. Apr. , ).
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This Article seeks to reframe existing takings law to provide a more
balanced approach towards temporary, regulatory takings claims. Section
A will explain how litigants can make the strongest cases for takings under
existing law. Section B will propose ways that courts can better approach
temporary, regulatory takings to respect economic liberty by broadening
both the Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra frameworks and adopting a
categorical framework to address the distinctive challenges posed by
economic liberty takings. Section C will lay out a potential statutory
framework as a substitute or complement to takings protections. Section
D will analyze the merits and tradeoffs of these approaches as applied to
the pandemic shutdowns and related restrictions.
A. The Potential for Economic Liberty Takings Claims Within Existing
Frameworks
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Under current takings frameworks, litigants face challenges based on
the manner in which courts define the denominator or “whole parcel” in
takings cases. 354 Coupled with the general deference courts give to
government exercises of emergency police powers and the deference
afforded to “temporary” regulations in takings analysis, the regulatory
takings landscape may seem very unfavorable. 355 However, the most
adversely affected businesses may be able to frame their economic liberty
claims within the Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra frameworks.

354
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See Murr v. Wisconsin,  S. Ct. , – () (“[B]ecause our test for regulatory taking
requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains
in the property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose
value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.’” (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis,  U.S. ,  ())).
355 See SH Health Consulting, LLC v. Page,  F. Supp. d ,  (E.D. Mo. ) (explaining
that based on the separation of powers, courts cannot second-guess the “wisdom or efficacy of [public
health] measures” (citing In re Rutledge,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ))); TJM , Inc. v. Harris,
 F. Supp. d ,  (W.D. Tenn. ) (noting that the court’s sole purpose is to determine
whether the Governor’s shutdown orders are reasonably related to the legitimate government goal of
combatting the pandemic).
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While it is generally difficult for litigants to win regulatory takings
clams under Penn Central when regulations address a public emergency,356
some categories of businesses may have a higher chance of success. 357 The
sweeping nature of the shutdowns suggest that an affected business would
have strong claims under Penn Central’s “economic impact” factor,
especially if the business can demonstrate it had no or limited alternative
means of revenue. 358 An affected business would also have a strong case
under the “investment-backed expectations” factor of the Penn Central
test. Both the pandemic and extraordinary shutdowns (and related
occupancy and operations limits) are extremely unforeseeable. While the
shutdowns fall within the state police powers, that authority has nothing
to do with the reasonable investment-backed expectations of businesses
that they could continue their business operations from March 2020 to
the present.
The most challenging part of the Penn Central test is “the character of
the government action,” since the shutdown regulations are efforts to
mitigate a public health emergency. Litigants would best be served
framing the shutdowns and related restrictions as unfair burdens because
of the government’s selectivity in restricting the operations of some
categories of businesses, while allowing similar businesses with a greater
range of products or scale to continue operations. Plaintiffs should argue
that shutdowns, while a legal exercise of state police powers, go “too far”
by constituting the equivalent of a temporary acquisition of private
property for public use. 359 To the extent that courts frame “the character
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See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  (); see also John D.
Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central,  UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y  () (analyzing and
refining the definitions of each Penn Central factor).
357 See, e.g., Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra,  F.d ,  (d Cir. ) (finding
the temporary closure of a flea market to allow for identification of unexploded munitions under a
parking lot was not a compensatory taking); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States,  F.d , 
(Fed. Cir. ) (holding that a USDA regulation barring the sale of eggs from salmonella-infected
chickens for twenty-five months was not a regulatory taking); Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 
N.W.d ,  (Iowa ) (finding no taking in state agency’s emergency order mandating the
quarantine of hunting preserve “for five years after whitetail deer harvested on the property tested
positive for chronic wasting disease”); TJM ,  F. Supp. d at  (rejecting a request for a
temporary restraining order against shutdown orders because the emergency character of the orders
outweighed the plaintiff’s economic impact and investment-backed expectations).
358 See, e.g., TJM ,  F. Supp. d at ; Elizabeth Wolstein, Do State Shutdown Orders Effect a
Taking for Which the State Must Pay Just Compensation?, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. , , : AM),
https://perma.cc/VZ-XCR.
359 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,  U.S. ,  ().
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of the government action” solely in terms of the public health emergency,
litigants should argue that this dimension is not a conclusive factor in the
Penn Central analysis and emphasize that Penn Central is a balancing test.
As such, the significance of the economic impact and investment-backed
expectations factors should counsel recognition of the economic liberty
takings claims related to the shutdowns.
To put this argument in context, it is worthwhile to refresh the
reader’s memory of the spectrum of potential takings claims presented in
Figure 2. 360 Virtually every type of business listed above could establish
that the shutdowns and related restrictions were not remotely in the
realm of their investment-based expectations to continue operations.
This context is fundamentally different from government delays or
denials of regulatory permits as businesses could have no stronger
expectation than their ability to engage in their operations (unless a
preexisting regulatory threat loomed such as environmental protection or
endangered species rules).
The businesses that would have the strongest chance of making
successful claims within the existing Penn Central framework would be
those who could demonstrate substantial economic impact with no
alternative way of sustaining profitability. Businesses in Categories One
to Three in Figure 2 would have the strongest claims because they could
show the dramatic impact of the shutdowns in causing bankruptcy, the
cut off of revenues in industries without viable alternatives to in-person
operations, or the stark economic impact due to seasonal and regional
considerations. This part of the test is ultimately an empirical question of
businesses being able to show the impact of government disruptions on
their bottom lines.
Businesses in Categories Four to Six would have a more difficult time
establishing viable takings claims under the existing Penn Central test
framework. These categories of businesses could substantiate a similar
disruption in investment-backed expectations. However, the economic
impact of regulations would likely be lower due to their ability to pursue
alternative revenues after closing in-person operations, such as through
online sales; the ability to have outdoor operations, such as in restaurants
later in the pandemic; or the ability to engage in viable business operations
even in the face of percentage limits on personnel or customers. Many of
the businesses that fall in these Categories, like restaurants and retail
stores, could fall into multiple categories depending on the time frame at
issue. For example, restaurants that were completely closed during the
first stage of the pandemic from March through May of 2020 (Category
Two), were allowed outside operations (Category Four) or occupancySee supra Section I.D.
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limited, in-person operations (Category Five) during the summer and
faced complete closures in certain states, such as New York and California
during the November 2020 to January 2021 surge in the virus’s spread. 361
Under the existing framework, restaurants would have the strongest
claims for the complete shutdowns, but they would have arguments for
takings even in the context of outdoor dining or limits on in-person
dining if they can document a substantial diminution in value. 362 To win
takings compensation, affected businesses must try to show that the
pandemic shutdowns are “forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.” 363

rin

tn

ot

pe

Under the temporary takings framework established by Tahoe-Sierra,
courts are unlikely to find the shutdowns to be a temporary taking for
most affected companies. The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra compared
the economic loss suffered during the regulation period with the value of
the property over its entire life, including after the regulation’s
termination. 364 This lifetime-value approach poses a nearly impossible
standard to meet for any business that can resume operations once the
temporary regulation ends. The exception to the rule would be companies
forced into bankruptcy or otherwise facing complete closure due to the
temporary regulation. The remaining lifetime value of these businesses
would essentially be zero, making the diminution in value approximate
the pre-regulation valuation of the business. 365 Other businesses would
have difficulty showing severe enough economic impact over the full
potential life of the company (as corporations have no set legal end to their
existence).
Courts may also be more sympathetic to temporary takings claims if
businesses can distinguish disruptions from shutdowns from traditional
temporary takings contexts. For example, many unsuccessful temporary
takings cases involved physical destructions or emergency appropriations

361

Id.
As the Court explained, “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  () (citation omitted).
363 Armstrong v. United States,  U.S. ,  ().
364 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. ,  ().
365 See Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf,  A.d ,  (Pa.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ().
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of property during wartime, 366 or as part of an effort to contain infectious
diseases among crops and animals. 367 In contrast, the broad-based
pandemic shutdowns involve restrictions on the use of private property
for much longer periods of time with the uncertainty of the scope and
duration of future shutdowns casting a pall over the affected businesses.
The shutdowns are also distinguishable from the Tahoe-Sierra case
itself. Unlike the development moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra, businesses are
not seeking to engage in a new use of their property but are seeking a
continuation of their existing operations. 368 In Tahoe-Sierra the
constraints on developing the properties did not eliminate all of the
affected owners’ income streams, but simply cut off the revenue they were
hoping to generate through one development project. 369 In contrast, the
broader scope of pandemic shutdowns forced many businesses to lose all
means of generating revenue for the duration of the shutdowns by
requiring them to suspend their in-person operations. 370 This fact, coupled
with the distinctions between essential and non-essential businesses, have
resulted in some businesses disproportionately taking on society’s
burdens to combat the pandemic.

pe

B. Reframing Takings Law to Protect Economic Liberty
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This Section proposes three changes to the courts’ takings
jurisprudence. First, courts could broaden Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra
to expand the scope of regulatory takings claims. Second, the Supreme
Court could consider reversing or limiting Tahoe-Sierra. Finally, courts
could adopt a modified categorical test for economic liberty takings.

366
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See, e.g., Doe v. United States,  Fed. Cl. ,  () (holding that the U.S. military’s
occupation of an Iraqi citizen’s home was not a taking because it fell within the military necessity
doctrine); United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc.,  U.S. ,  () (holding that no compensation
was owed for the U.S. army’s destruction of a petroleum depot because it was done out of military
necessity); United States v. Pac. R.R.,  U.S. ,  () (holding that the destruction of bridges
for war purposes was not a compensable taking).
367 See, e.g., Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk,  So. d ,  (Fla. ) (holding that
the Department of Agriculture’s destruction of healthy citrus trees to prevent a citrus canker outbreak
was a compensable taking); see also Keyah Grande, LLC v. Colo. Dep’t of Agric.,  P.d ,  (Colo.
App. ) (holding there to be a compensable taking when the Colorado Department of Agriculture’s
destroyed an elk herder’s entire herd in order to determine whether the herd had a fatal disease).
368 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Cuomo, -cv-,  WL , at * (E.D.N.Y. June , ).
369 See Tahoe-Sierra,  U.S. at .
370 See Report: How Many Local Businesses Have Had to Close Due to COVID-?, supra note .
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One potential solution to the challenges facing economic liberty
takings claims would be for courts to embrace a more expansive
interpretation of Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra. Currently, the Penn
Central test rarely proves favorable for property owners as it is
conventionally known as the “station” where regulatory takings claims go
to die. 371 Part of the problem is that courts routinely give conclusory
weight to the character of the government action and fail to consider that
takings compensation may be justified even in cases where the state is
legitimately exercising its police powers. Courts should give more weight
to investment-backed expectations and the economic harm analysis of
Penn Central claims and less weight to the character of the government
action analysis.
Placing Greater Emphasis on the Investment-Backed
Expectations Factor

pe

In applying the Penn Central balancing test, courts can place greater
emphasis on the investment-backed expectations of affected businesses.
The Federal Circuit, in Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 372 decided that
investment-backed expectations were to be considered by looking at three
factors:

ot

() whether the plaintiff operated in a “highly regulated industry;” () whether the plaintiff
was aware of the problem that spawned the regulation . . . ; and () whether the plaintiff
could have “reasonably anticipated” the possibility of such regulation in light of the
“regulatory environment” at the time of purchase. 373
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One could argue that the developers in Tahoe-Sierra were taking on
the reasonable risk of new development restrictions given widespread
awareness of this type of risk. But it is hard to argue that a mom-and-pop
shop or a multi-national corporation could have reasonably anticipated
the nature of the COVID-19 crisis or the scope of the shutdowns. The
nature of Penn Central as a balancing test can and should give courts
flexibility to give more weight to the investment-backed expectations
factor.

371
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See, e.g., TJM , Inc. v. Harris,  F. Supp. d , – (W.D. Tenn. ).
 F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
373 Id. at  (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir.
)); cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,  U.S. , – () (rejecting the “notice rule,” which
treated a purchaser’s notice of the pre-existing restriction as an absolute bar to a takings claim).
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The denominator for regulatory takings should be redefined as the
profitability of the business prior to the regulation as this reflects the
baseline for assessing the regulation’s impact on the return on investment.
This approach is consistent with the logic of Penn Central itself as the
Court reasoned that the New York historic preservation law did not
interfere in any way with the present use of the train terminal and allowed
the company to obtain a “reasonable return” on its investment. 374 TahoeSierra warped this analysis for temporary takings by defining the whole
parcel (i.e., the denominator) as the entire lifetime value of the property,
rather than the impact on the property during the time frame of the
regulation’s application. The Tahoe-Sierra approach misses the economic
impact of regulations as businesses cannot recoup the earnings from the
period that a regulation is in effect. 375
The dilemma in framing temporary regulatory takings compensation
is determining which metric courts should use in assessing a regulation’s
impact on businesses. In the case of physical takings, courts can use the
comparable sales lens just like property assessors to accurately gauge a
property’s value. Temporary, regulatory takings do not lend themselves to
that type of calculation especially when it comes to businesses. Publicly
traded companies can provide snapshots of their market capitalization
before and after a regulation’s termination based on changes in their stock
prices. But most companies affected by regulation are privately held, and
it is difficult and time-consuming to assess the market value of a privately
held businesses, let alone to calculate the changes in value that are
attributable to a regulation. 376 More importantly, the issue for most
temporary, regulatory takings is the economic impact on the business for
the time horizon of the regulation at issue, rather than the long-term
change in a company’s valuation.
Courts could choose losses, revenue decreases, or decreases in
profitability (i.e., net income). The underlying concerns are moral hazard,
ease of administration, and the extent of potential compensation. If courts
(or legislators) choose economic losses caused by the regulation as the
framework for takings compensation, then affected companies may have
incentives to inflate their losses and not attempt to mitigate the damages

374
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Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  ().
See William W. Wade, Temporary Takings, Tahoe Sierra, and the Denominator Problem, 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS ,  () (arguing that “[l]ost use of property is measured
by lost earnings, not a change in real property value”).
376 Id. at –.
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caused by a regulation. This can be framed as the “restaurant problem,” as
restaurants are notorious for creatively generating losses to avoid having
to pay income taxes. 377
If courts choose revenue decreases as the metric for takings
compensation, then a similar danger of businesses’ inflating lost revenue
exists. Sales taxes in most states effectively require companies to keep
track of their revenues in ways that are confirmable by state governments.
Even in the states where there is no sales tax, accounting fraud rules would
require that companies document their revenue flows. The dilemma is
that using a lost-revenue lens may encourage companies to move
transactions off the books and to understate their revenues, a concern that
arises in the context of cash-only small businesses. An additional concern
is that potential takings compensation would not reflect the varying cost
structures of businesses. For example, the cost structure significantly
differs from restaurant-to-restaurant as some restaurants will focus on
service and the employee-related costs that come with that, while others
may offer food in a no-frills environment. Comparing apples to oranges in
revenue changes may obscure the deeper impact on shutdowns on their
bottom lines. The shortcoming of both the loss and decrease in revenue
lenses is that courts would face expensive, time-consuming inquiries to
determine the scope of damages and extent of damage mitigation as well
as concerns of open-ended liability for governments.
This fact raises the appeal of focusing on the difference in a business’s
profitability caused by an exogenous regulatory shock. 378 The appeal of
this approach is that it would facilitate ease of administration, protect
against fraudulent efforts to inflate compensation, and cap compensation
to make an expansion of takings feasible. Both federal and state tax
returns form an easily confirmable reference point as net profits (i.e., net
income) form the basis for tax exposure. If companies understated their
profits to avoid past taxation, then they would be penalized because they
would have a lower threshold for assessing potential pandemic takings
claims. But if companies disclosed their profits, then they would be in a
position to establish both the existence and extent of economic liberty
takings claims. The virtue of this approach is in potentially rewarding
companies for their honesty in reporting profitability in past years (and
paying the resulting taxes in normal times) by making the previous year’s
profits (or a multi-year average) the baseline for takings compensation.
377
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See, e.g., Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Restaurant Owners Charged with Tax Offenses
and Other Crimes (Sept. , ), https://perma.cc/GJJ-KKG.
378 Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega IX),  Fed. Cl. ,  (), vacated,  F.d
 (Fed. Cir. ) (“Measuring an owner’s return on equity better demonstrates the economic
impact . . . of temporary takings of income-generating property than a measurement of the change in
fair market value.” (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,  U.S. ,  ())).
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The downside of using net profits as a proxy for takings compensation
is that it may be over-inclusive or under-inclusive. A company’s net profits
may significantly vary year-to-year based on business conditions, which is
why using an average of reported net profits over a period of years may be
a more equitable baseline. As an alternative baseline, net income data
could be used to estimate cash flows for the coming years and discount
those cash flows to estimate the present value. Nonetheless, a legitimate
concern is that a focus on profitability may understate the extent of
economic impact. The losses incurred by businesses that were not able to
operate during the shutdowns may far eclipse their previous year’s
profitability. That is a fair critique as a net profits-compensation lens may
be systematically under-inclusive.
The counterpoint is that this cap on takings compensation will partly
be offset by a business’s duty to mitigate damages. Affected companies
would have every incentive to cut overhead in the face of a temporary,
regulatory taking if net profits were the proxy for potential compensation.
That would have real-world consequences for dislocated employees, but
this Article’s premise is to create a viable framework for temporary,
regulatory takings and not to solve every problem related to exogenous
regulatory shocks. For example, other parallel support such as the PPP
program to incentivize the rehiring of furloughed workers and bolstered
unemployment support may still be needed to mitigate the economic
fallout from shutdowns.
One positive externality from this approach is that it would reward
companies and individuals for their honesty in tax compliance. The higher
the level of disclosure of past net income (and the lower the tax fraud), the
greater the potential claim for economic liberty takings. This approach
would be easy for courts to administer and would provide caps on
damages, so that state governors could more easily anticipate the likely
takings compensation required for their regulatory actions and shape
their decisions accordingly.
c.

Deemphasizing the “Character of the Government Action”
Factor
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Courts should also reconsider the weight placed on the character of
the government action under the Penn Central test. State governors and
courts have frequently framed the shutdowns as an appropriate and
reasonable exercise of police powers to promote the public good.379
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379 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Colorado,  F. Supp. d ,  (D. Colo. ); Henry v. DeSantis,
 F. Supp. d ,  (S.D. Fla. ); Lewis v. Walz,  F. Supp. d ,  (D. Minn. );
Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf,  A.d ,  (Pa. ).
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However, the Supreme Court in Lingle held that the focus of the character
inquiry should not be on the purpose, correctness, or “underlying validity”
of the government action. 380 Instead, the focus should be on the nature
and severity of the action, such as whether it targets a select group rather
than the public as a whole, and whether it applies retroactively, involves
any physical action, or provides any offsetting benefits. 381
The legality of the exercise of state police powers does not address the
merits of the takings claim and should not be regarded as a dispositive
factor in the Penn Central test. Courts should treat the Penn Central test as
a genuine balancing test and place greater weight on the investmentbacked expectations of businesses and the economic impact of
regulations, if a select group of businesses are bearing a burden for the
good of the public.
Courts should also reconsider the extent to which emergency and
public necessity exceptions can justify the denial of regulatory taking
claims under the character of the government action prong. The scope
and nature of these exceptions are distinguishable from regulatory
shutdowns. Emergency and public necessity takings typically involve the
physical appropriation or destruction of property, such as during times of
war, conflagration, and disease. In contrast, regulatory takings limit
owners’ use of their property and disregard the potential for owners to use
their properties in ways that address public health concerns. Although
shutdown orders are a legitimate exercise of states’ police power to protect
the public health, Justice Holmes in Mahon emphasized that such
regulations can go too far, so as to constitute a taking. 382 The two are not
mutually exclusive.
Reversing or Limiting Tahoe-Sierra to Apply a Categorical Lens
to Temporary Regulatory Takings

rin

tn

Tahoe-Sierra ruled that the Lucas categorical rule does not apply to
temporary regulatory takings. 383 However, given the nature and scope of
the shutdowns, the opportunity may be ripe for the Supreme Court to
revisit the temporary takings doctrine and overrule Tahoe-Sierra.

380

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,  U.S. ,  ().
See David W. Spohr, Cleaning Up the Rest of Agins: Bringing Coherence to Temporary Takings
Jurisprudence and Jettisoning “Extraordinary Delay,”  ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS , 
().
382 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,  U.S. ,  ().
383 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. , – ().
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The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra rejected the application of the
Lucas categorical takings framework to temporary takings. 384 But more
recent cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit suggest the
potential applicability of a categorical approach to these types of cases. For
example, in 2020 the Federal Circuit in Caquelin v. United States385 held
that the issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) that froze a
railroad carrier’s abandonment of a rail line constituted a coerced
easement against the Plaintiff’s land, making the NITU a temporary
taking falling under the Lucas categorical rule. 386 This case, although
involving a physical taking, reinforced the understanding that temporary
physical takings are potentially subject to the categorical rule. Similarly, in
Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 387 the Federal Circuit held that the
Army Corps of Engineers’ denial of a land developer’s wetland fill permit,
which covered five out of the developer’s several thousand acres of land,
was a Lucas categorical taking requiring just compensation. 388 The court
did not evaluate the five acres against the other thousands of acres but
rather considered the five-acre parcel as a distinct parcel which was
stripped of value. 389
The Merits of the Lucas Categorical Takings Approach
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The premise for applying the Lucas categorical takings approach is
that a subset of the shutdown orders that prevent business owners and
customers from operating are constructively the equivalent of a physical
taking for the duration of the regulation. Treating this type of temporary
taking as a per se taking under the Lucas rule would better capture the
impact on businesses that have no alternative way of operating during
shutdowns.
Even though the shutdowns and related restrictions are temporary,
Lucas should apply because the context in Tahoe-Sierra is distinguishable
from shutdowns. The developers in Tahoe-Sierra could resume plans for
an undeveloped parcel once the moratorium was lifted, while during the
384
385
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Id.
 F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
Id. at , –.
 F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
Id. at .
See id. at , –.
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pandemic, businesses had existing operations disrupted in ways that may
have short- and long-run financial effects. The severity and potentially
lasting consequences of the “temporary” shutdowns are very different
than a temporal delay in development. 390 Therefore, the Lucas categorical
takings approach would be the more appropriate framework for the
affected businesses.
Courts have expressed concerns about the functionality and
practicality of takings, when asked to apply a categorical approach to
regulatory takings. 391 However, the disruption of the ability of businesses
to function is fundamentally different from conventional land-use
regulations and justifies the deterrent effect of potential takings
compensation. In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court explained its hesitance to apply
the Lucas framework to temporary land use regulations because

er
r

[Government regulations] are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in
some tangential way—often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se
takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could
afford. 392

tn

ot

pe

However, shutdowns do not impact businesses tangentially; their
impacts on the bottom lines of businesses are specific and directly
measurable. Reversing Tahoe-Sierra would not necessarily lead to
floodgates of compensation claims. The prospective application of
compensation for shutdowns would lead state governments to think
carefully about designing less invasive means to achieve policy objectives
that sidestep takings compensation. This approach would create greater
balance between state police powers and respect for the economic liberty
of businesses. Additionally, the reliance on the reduction in net profits
would introduce a limiting principle to damages that would contain the
damages that governments would face. These considerations should
provide courts with strong reasons to re-visit Tahoe-Sierra and to apply a
Lucas categorical framework to temporary, regulatory takings.
c.

The High Bar for Categorical Takings Under the Lucas
Approach

rin

Even if courts embrace the Lucas categorical rule for temporary,
regulatory takings, litigants will still have to establish a high level of
economic impact. Under existing applications of categorical takings, a
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390 See Lewis Wiener, Victor Haley & Rikki Stern, Biz Closures May Revive Property Takings Issue at
High Court, LAW (May , , : PM), https://perma.cc/QVX-BRUG.
391 See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido,  U.S. , ,  (); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City,  U.S. , – ().
392 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. ,  ().

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4005552

iew
ed

Economic Liberty Takings

2021]

143

3.

er
r

ev

regulation must deprive a property owner of over 99% of the economic
use of his property. 393 For example, claims of an 87.5% 394 and even a 94%395
diminution in value have failed. Less than 1% of Lucas claims succeed, and
claimants must establish the regulated property is separate from their
other holdings and show that their economic expectations pre-date the
regulation. 396
With temporary takings cases in particular, the diminution in value
clearly relies heavily on the denominator. When assessed under the TahoeSierra whole parcel rule, which defines the denominator as the entire
lifetime value of the property, businesses that must permanently close
after the pandemic may end up with near comprehensive diminution in
values and be the most likely types of firms to win a Lucas claim. However,
if courts were to adopt a different denominator by focusing on the decline
in a business’s net profits due to the regulation, then it may be possible for
a larger group of affected businesses to make viable Lucas takings claims.
Applying a Modified Categorical Lens to Temporary, Regulatory
Takings
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Opening the door to Lucas categorical takings claims would create
potential claims for bankrupt businesses, but the high bar for existing
categorical takings may frustrate most other claims of infringement of
economic liberty. At the same time, the desirability of a categorical
approach is that it would facilitate ease of administration, which is
important given the volume of potential economic liberty takings claims
due to the shutdowns. For this reason, the key to establishing a viable
doctrinal or statutory approach to regulatory takings would be to create a
more expansive categorical test in the temporary, regulatory takings
context.
This Article’s proposed categorical test for economic liberty takings
would have four dimensions: (1) is the regulation a deviation from
ordinary investment-backed expectation?; (2) is the regulation a complete

Pr

ep

rin

393 See Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas:
Making or Breaking the Takings Claim,  IOWA L. REV. ,  () (categorizing the types of
successful Lucas takings cases).
394 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian,  U.S. , – ().
395 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,  U.S. ,  ().
396 See, e.g., Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ) (finding a
.% diminution in value); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,  F.d , – (Fed. Cir.
), abrogated by Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ) (finding
a diminution of value greater than %); State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State,  N.E.d ,  (Ohio
) (finding a categorical taking of all of plaintiff’s coal rights after the State designated the property
as one unsuitable for mining).
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or partial closure?; (3) has the business faced a loss of 75% or more of net
profits during the time frame the regulation was in place?; and (4) is the
alleged economic harm causally related to the government mandate or is
there an equally compelling inference of market causation?
a.

Is the Regulation a Deviation from Ordinary InvestmentBacked Expectations?
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The ubiquity of the regulatory state means that businesses must
anticipate that governments and administrative bodies will routinely issue
new regulations. 397 This fact means that the overwhelming majority of
regulations are not deviations from ordinary investment-backed
expectations but rather are possibilities routinely factored into business
decision-making. However, regulations that constitute deviations from
reasonable expectations of regulations form a baseline for assessing
potential economic liberty takings claims. This approach would also
prevent companies from opportunistically stepping into a takings claim.
For example, every company must factor environmental regulations
into their investment decisions. Companies must consider the risk that
protection for the habitat of the spotted owl or other species may limit
logging in the Pacific Northwest or how declines in protected trout
populations may lead to limits on the operation of hydroelectric dams. But
exogenous regulatory shocks are different from regulatory risks that
cannot be reasonably anticipated. The pandemic falls in the “black swan”
category of very low-probability, high-impact events that are not on the
radar screen of the government regulator or business world. The clearest
evidence of that is in public company disclosures prior to January 2020.
There is no evidence that any American public company identified a
pandemic as a principal risk that could affect their financial performance
or as a risk at all. 398 This regulatory frustration of the ability of businesses
to operate during the pandemic undercut the investment expectations of
the business community and has laid the groundwork for potential
economic liberty takings claims.
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397 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ETSY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES
USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
().
398 Cf.  C.F.R. § . () (noting the requirement for registrants to provide a “discussion
of the most significant [risk] factors”).
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The second part of the modified categorical takings analysis would be
to determine whether the business was subject to a closure mandate or an
occupancy or operations limit, which approximated a partial closure.
Governments regulate virtually every facet of a business’s operations, and
few would contest most forms of regulatory authority exercised in the
name of public health and safety. For example, fire regulations limit the
number of people in a room or building, and these restrictions are
displayed in virtually every publicly accessible building. The question is
whether the nature of the regulations effectively closed or partly closed
the business for a duration beyond ordinary expectations for emergencies
and their immediate aftermath. What distinguished the pandemic
shutdowns is their duration, extent, and recurring nature.
The economic fallout from the pandemic broadly affected businesses,
but state government designations of businesses as “non-essential”
subjected them to full or partial closures. 399 While some stores had
potential alternative revenue sources through online sales, full closure of
retail stores often left them with no alternatives. For example, restaurants
could plausibly host outdoor dining during warm months, while shoe and
clothing stores faced more daunting tasks of attempting to sell products
“outside” in front of their shops. 400 State governments frequently
employed oscillating occupancy limits based on the state’s assessments of
the extent of positive COVID cases and intensive-care unit
hospitalizations. 401 The 25% to 50% occupancy limits allowed businesses
to function yet imposed constraints that inflicted significant impacts to
the bottom line of profitability. 402 Restrictions on the operation of
businesses have had similar effects to occupancy limits. Some service and
manufacturing businesses were allowed to function but faced significant
constraints on employees working on the business property or on the
number of employees allowed to be in shared spaces.

399
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See generally COVID-: Select State and Local Business Closures and Reopenings Tracker (US),
PRAC. L. REAL EST. (July , ), https://perma.cc/RT-BSF (providing an overview of the business
closures).
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,  S. Ct. ,  () (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (discussing how a range of actors faced occupancy limits ranging from casinos to
churches).
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The Lucas test traditionally sets the bar for categorical takings
compensation at a high level of over a 99% diminution in value. 403 If the
policy objective is to limit takings claims as much as possible and to give
governments unfettered ability to restrict businesses, then this threshold
is easy to justify. But if the objective is to strike a better balance between
state police powers and the economic liberty of businesses, then courts
should apply a lower threshold for assessing the extent of diminution in
value.
The challenge is determining what lower threshold of economic harm
is required to trigger a taking. Setting this threshold at a 75% reduction in
net profits would significantly change the landscape for economic liberty
takings and cause state governments to think more carefully about the
scope of future emergency restrictions. 404 The virtue of this approach is
that net profits is information that every business must report to the
government as part of their federal, state, and local tax filings. This fact
means that courts would have an easy frame of reference for
understanding the potential impact of government restrictions on
business. Focusing on net profits also places a cap on potential takings
claims as it would effectively incentivize businesses to mitigate further
damages due to an exogenous regulatory shock.
Like virtually every number used by courts or regulators, there is
nothing unique about picking a threshold of a 75% decline in net profits.
But there is nothing unique about the numerical thresholds that judges
have made up on their own. That number could just as easily be 80% or
85%, if courts want to err on the side of caution in terms of opening the
potential for economic liberty takings claims. For example, the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims has stated that it generally has “relied on diminutions
well in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking” under the
Penn Central regulatory taking test. 405 There have been examples of claims
argued under Penn Central with diminution in values of 75%,406 81%,407 and
even 95% 408 that were not enough on their own to constitute a regulatory
403
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Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,  U.S. , ,  n. ().
See CCA Assocs. v. United States,  Fed. Cl. ,  (), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
F. App’x  (Fed. Cir. ); Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega IX),  Fed. Cl. ,  (),
vacated,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ); Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega VIII),  F.d ,
 (Fed. Cir. ).
405 Walcek v. United States,  Fed. Cl. ,  (), aff’d,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
406 Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.,  U.S. ,  ().
407 MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ).
408 William C. Haas & Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,  F.d ,  (th Cir. )
(holding that despite the city’s zoning ordinance decreasing the property value from $,, to
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taking. 409 On the other hand, there has been a successful Penn Central
taking with a diminution in value as low as 71.3%. 410 But the logic is that a
75% impact on net profits would signal the significant impact of the
regulation at issue. Lowering the threshold would open the possibility for
a broader spectrum of affected businesses to have potential takings claims.
At the same time, incorporating limiting principles to these claims would
seek to avoid having governments pay compensation, if they can show
that economic changes or the failure to mitigate damages led to decreases
in profitability.
Having a threshold of a 75% reduction in profitability would give each
level of government greater incentives to think through the potential
impact of regulations or to scale those regulations back if they end up
having a larger impact on economic liberty than anticipated (i.e., to reduce
the scope of potential takings claims). This approach has the added value
of rewarding corporate honesty. Companies that understated net profits
or failed to report profits in the previous year would hamstring their own
ability to bring economic liberty takings claims or reduce the amount of
potential claims. This approach may seem harsh. But bear in mind these
companies would still be potentially eligible for other forms of
government relief, such as forgivable PPP loans.
Is the Alleged Economic Harm Causally Related to the
Regulation? Or Is There an Equally Compelling Inference of
Market Causation or a Failure to Mitigate Damages?
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Lowering the threshold for categorical takings claims would open the
potential for many more businesses to claim potential takings. But courts
would need to be able to consider offsetting limiting principles, such as
whether the economic harms alleged are causally related to the regulation
at issue. Courts have frequently exploited a loophole in current takings
law to dismiss takings claims by asserting that there is no causation
between pandemic regulations and the alleged harms. For example, recall
the decision discussed earlier that a gentleman’s club that was closed by
the government did not have a takings claim because its in-house
restaurant did not mitigate damages by selling food and drink on the
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$,, the public benefits of the regulations outweighed the economic loss and did not constitute
a taking).
409 See Echeverria, supra note , at .
410 Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,  Fed. Cl. , ,  () (holding that the denial of
an application for a dredge-and-fill permit was a partial taking under the Penn Central analysis).
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street corner. 411 One can only imagine the headlines that a gentleman’s
club turned prurient street snack provider would create.
The court in that case misapplied the duty to mitigate damages as a
conclusory factor to reject a takings claim. But governments should be
able to argue that takings claims should be offset by any amount of loss
that reasonably could have been avoided by the affected business. 412 For
example, if a retail store that is subject to an occupancy limit refuses to
pursue cost-effective online alternatives to bolster sales, that may be a
legitimate factor in considering compensation. Retail shops or
manufacturing may have that option, while it would be unrealistic for a
barbershop or beauty salon whose services are not readily replicable
online.
Another limiting principle that courts or legislators should wrestle
with is how to distinguish economic fallout from the pandemic as
opposed to fallout caused by government-mandated shutdowns. For
example, a gentleman’s club could have had a precipitous fall in business
due to customers’ reluctance to be in a close-quarters business given the
risks of COVID-19 contagion. The challenge is that this requires counterfactual analysis as the shutdowns short-circuited the ability to confirm
whether self-initiated changes in consumer activity—rather than
government-mandated changes—could have led to similar economic
results.
Governments should be able to rebut economic liberty takings claims
by pointing to evidence of market causation. For instance, many
businesses which failed during pandemic shutdowns may have had
underlying economic issues and may have suffered losses either way.
Think of outlet stores: destination stores typically located 1 to 1.5 hours
outside of cities that typically offer surplus or economy versions of a
company’s products. The outlet industry had been under siege for years
before the pandemic due to the rise of Amazon and other online retailers
and competition from an array of brick-and-mortar discount stores, such
as TJ Maxx, which offered discount shopping coupled with greater
convenience. 413 The closure of outlet stores for well-known brands such as
Harry & David, Van Heusen, Wilson’s Leather, and Bass Shoes, may have
had everything to do with fading business models that the pandemic
disrupted rather than the fallout from shutdowns.

411

See McCarthy v. Cuomo, No. -cv-,  WL , at * (E.D.N.Y. June , ).
Fischer v. Heymann,  N.E.d ,  (Ind. ) (discussing the application of the common
law rule to mitigate damages under tort and contract law).
413 Nikaela Jacko Redd & Lutisha S. Vickerie, The Rise and Fall of Brick and Mortar Retail: The
Impact of Emerging Technologies and Executive Choices on Business Failure,  J. INT’L BUS. & L. , 
().
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The challenge that governments would face in rebutting economicliberty-takings claims would be to establish an equally compelling
inference of market causation compared to that of regulatory causation.
The type of evidence that could support this would be the preexisting lack
of profitability of the business at issue, difficulties in raising new capital
in the run up to the pandemic, or pre-existing bankruptcy restructurings.
By placing the burden on the government to establish this inference, this
approach would protect against opportunistic efforts by companies to use
takings claims as bailouts for businesses that were already in economic
trouble before the pandemic. That being said, the contours of the
proposed takings compensation offer a limiting principle to potential
claims. Using decreases in net profits as the measuring stick for takings
compensation means that businesses that were already unprofitable prior
to the regulation at issue would not be able to exploit takings claims as
backdoor bailouts.
Lastly, businesses may have enjoyed reciprocal benefits from the crisis
or the government’s intervention that may mitigate the scope of potential
takings compensation. For example, an office supply company may have
faced the full shutdown of its brick-and-mortar retail operations or a 50%
occupancy limit that constrained sales for months throughout the
pandemic. Shutdown restrictions have hurt sales to conventional
corporate clients whose in person operations were significantly curtailed.
At the same time, the company’s home office sales may have experienced
explosive growth due to the similar restrictions forcing employees to work
from home. Taking reciprocal benefits into account would force potential
economic liberty takings claimants to aggregate their shutdown-related
losses and profits. Otherwise, claimants could potentially distort claims
by focusing only on the adversely affected parts of the business and
obscure offsetting growth to other parts.

tn

C. Statutory Framework for Economic Liberty Takings
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While the pandemic provides courts with an opportunity to rethink
the contours of temporary, regulatory takings, courts may be reluctant to
initiate changes in takings law given the scale of impacted businesses (and
potential claims). For this reason, a statutory approach for creating
economic liberty takings is an important alternative to consider. This
approach can institutionalize the framework for economic liberty takings
discussed above yet be designed in ways that streamline the processing of
claims through an administrative, rather than judicial process. 414 The
414
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A statutory approach would build on former President Reagan’s Executive Order No. ,
which sought to require federal agencies to submit a takings impact analysis to the Office of

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4005552

iew
ed

George Mason Law Review

150

[Vol. 29:1

tn

ot

pe

er
r

ev

legislature would be well-positioned to analyze the incentive effects from
establishing a broader conception of takings and to establish
administrative procedures for assessing claims. 415 In contrast, judges
necessarily have to address takings claims on a case-by-case basis, which
is expensive and time-consuming and casts a pall of greater uncertainty
on affected property owners.
A statutory framework for economic liberty takings could provide
clear expectations for government actors and businesses in terms of
takings exposure. Business owners would know prior to making
investments the potential recourse for government action that falls
outside of the bounds of investment-backed expectations. State officials
could use this framework as a guide to understand how to minimize
exposure to compensation liability by allowing businesses to function to
the greatest extent consistent with the underlying public policy objectives.
This strategy would mitigate the problem of businesses lacking legal
recourse and being treated as supplicants with politicians determining
handouts in an ad hoc way. The problems with the forgivable PPP loan
program highlighted the dangers of this approach. Large franchise
companies manipulated the PPP system to jump the queue ahead of small
businesses and drained the system of available funds. 416 In a world without
economic liberty takings, small businesses who could not secure PPP
loans were left to beg politicians for “more, sir” in Dickens-esque fashion
rather than having clear expectations of compensation for shutdowns.
An additional advantage of a statutory approach is that it could
introduce the potential for partial takings compensation that fall short of
temporary, regulatory takings based on the extent of economic impact.
The current judicial process creates “all or nothing” stakes that may make
courts reluctant to recognize takings claims, especially in the context of
temporary, regulatory takings. In contrast, a statutory takings approach
could encompass a sliding scale of compensation based on the severity of
the impact of the government regulation.
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Management and Budget. Exec. Order No. ,  C.F.R.  (). Subsequent administrations
abandoned this approach, but Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi, have embraced takings statutes that
require owners to be compensated when government action diminishes private property values by
%, %, or % or more respectively. See LA. STATE. ANN. § : (); MISS. CODE ANN. § - (West ); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § .()(B)(ii) (). The existence of state takings
statutes suggests the potential political plausibility of establishing an economic liberty takings
framework for temporary, regulatory takings.
415 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
“Just Compensation” Law,  HARV. L. REV. , – () (discussing how “settlement costs”
shape utilitarian analysis as to which takings should receive compensation).
416 Cf. Redd & Vickerie, supra note , at (discussing the unique complexities faced by larger
companies in the face of emerging technologies and market dynamics).
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Companies affected by future shutdowns could be eligible for full
compensation of their lost profits for the duration of the regulation if it
leads to a 75% or greater reduction in their net profits, so long as the
government cannot show offsetting economic basis or a failure to
mitigate the damages. The advantage of a statutory approach is that it
could provide for more modest levels of compensation for companies with
partial declines in profits from shutdowns that do not rise to the 75%
threshold.
A statutory approach could offer a sliding scale of partial
compensation for companies with between a 50% and 75% decline in net
profits. For companies just below the 75% threshold the takings
compensation could be half of the loss in profits and going
proportionately down to one-quarter of the lost profits for companies
with 50% declines in net profits. Similarly, companies with between 25%
and 50% declines in profits could have eligibility for compensation going
proportionately from 25% of the lost profits down to 12.5%—half the loss
in profits. The logic of this approach would be to preserve incentives for
companies to return to profitability as soon as possible, while providing
them with a degree of financial insulation to protect their long-term
viability.
The underlying premise for partial takings compensation would be
that this approach could replace the endless array of ad hoc giveaways and
handouts to businesses. Ad hoc processes are more easily manipulated
through political donations, influence peddling, and set asides that
benefit large corporations. Having a uniform system for offering a
measure of compensation for affected companies could provide greater
predictability for government actors to assess the financial costs of their
actions and give businesses greater certainty in grappling with future
exogenous regulatory shocks.
A statutory framework is not meant to create endless streams of
litigation and government payouts. Instead, this approach is meant to
incentivize governors to anticipate the economic costs of their
regulations, when making decisions during emergencies like a global
pandemic. This should diminish the extent of ad hoc rent seeking in the
event of future exogenous regulatory shocks by providing metrics in
advance for how to approach compensation. In turn, governors will have
clearer guidance on how regulation needs to be designed to steer clear of
potential takings claims and compensation payouts, thus saving the time
and money of property owners, state legislatures, and courts.
The ultimate benefit of a statutory framework is that it can help to
broaden the scope of regulatory takings relative to those recognized under
Penn Central, Tahoe-Sierra, and Lucas. A statutory framework can
recognize the percentage impact of takings rather than the “all or nothing”
approach that dominates and marginalizes the significance of existing
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takings law. It could also serve as a complement in codifying and
streamlining the recognition of economic liberty takings by establishing a
simpler administrative process and framework for compensation. Given
the large scale of pandemic-related takings litigation—in spite of the high
odds against success—establishing a clear framework may answer a policy
need and can give both states and businesses greater guidance on the
scope of temporary, regulatory takings.

ev

D. Application to the Spectrum of Affected Businesses

This Section suggests how the above proposals would operate
depending on the severity of a business’s economic impact.
Category One: Bankruptcies

er
r

1.

Category Two: Businesses with No Alternative Ways of
Generating Revenue

tn

2.
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pe

While businesses driven into bankruptcy during the pandemic
shutdowns represent the most extreme economic impact, bankruptcies
would not automatically trigger a taking. In examining causation factors,
both under existing takings law and this Article’s proposed reforms, judges
will have to weigh the extent to which market forces rather than
government action led to the bankruptcies. That may pose a challenge as
many bankrupt businesses were already struggling with changes in
consumer behavior and markets that are distinct from the pandemic
shutdown and could have been in jeopardy just from the pandemic’s
economic fallout. However, if shutdowns pushed companies from
profitability into bankruptcy restructurings or liquidations, then the firms
will have strong arguments both under Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra and
this Article’s proposal for a more expansive economic liberty takings
approach. 417
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Businesses that have no alternative means for revenue have faced
severe economic consequences from the shutdowns. Under the Penn
Central framework, these types of businesses, such as barbershops and
beauty salons, would have both investment-backed expectations of
operating and sufficiently severe economic declines in profitability to

417
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See Dina Gerdeman, Coronavirus Could Create a ‘Bankruptcy Pandemic’, HARV. BUS. SCHOOL
(May , ), https://perma.cc/VK-VXR.
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justify potential takings claims. 418 However, Tahoe-Sierra’s focus on the
life-time value of the property at issue, rather than during the period of
the regulation, would make it difficult for these types of businesses to
establish temporary takings. 419
This stumbling block for takings claims would be overcome by
embracing this Article’s proposed reform of treating temporal property
interests in a more traditional property-law way as distinct and severable
from ownership. By viewing the period of the shutdowns as a distinct part
of ownership—akin to a lease period—then it would be easier for courts—
or a statute—to focus on the lost profits caused by shutdowns. A business
with no revenues during the shutdowns would still have a value once the
shutdown is over—if it is still solvent—but it would not be able to recoup
the lost profits from the shutdown unless it had access to the proposed
economic liberty takings compensation.
3. Category Three: Seasonal and Regional Businesses
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Seasonal and regional businesses share similar risk exposure to the
businesses, which had no alternative revenue streams during the
shutdowns. But the difference is that their risk exposure may vary based
on the time of year when periodic shutdowns occur. For example, seasonal
businesses in Maine that were forced to shut down during the late spring
and summer of 2020 may have lost over 90% of their annual revenues
because the shutdowns occurred during peak tourist season. 420 Like
businesses with no alternative revenue sources, these Maine businesses
have strong cases under the current Penn-Central test, but their claims may
potentially flounder on Tahoe-Sierra’s focus on the life-time value of the
property. 421 The paradox is that while the businesses may still limp on until
next tourist season, the loss of a summer’s profits could impair their
viability long after the end of the shutdowns.
This Article’s reform proposal of focusing temporary takings analysis
solely on the economic fallout for businesses during the shutdowns would
give seasonal and regional businesses potentially valid claims. Some
categories of seasonal and regional businesses, such as summer camps or
tourist attractions, may be able to show that the shutdowns deprived them
of all economically viable use of their property, which would meet the
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418 Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. ,  () (discussing the three
factors that should be considered when engaging in the “ad hoc, factual inquir[y]”).
419 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,  U.S. , – ().
420 Chloe Teboe, Collins, King Introduce New Legislation to Help Some Small Seasonal Businesses,
NEWS CTR. ME. (Apr. , , : AM), https://perma.cc/CRS-DPC.
421 Compare Penn Cent.,  U.S. at , with Tahoe-Sierra,  U.S. at –.
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requirements for a Lucas categorical taking. For example, travel to Hawaii
fell by an outstanding 98.9% during the shutdowns, cutting off most
tourist-related businesses completely from any revenue, let alone hope for
profits. 422 However, most seasonal and regional businesses would not be
able to meet Lucas’s lofty standard. Instead, the economic liberty takings
proposal would be appealing in letting businesses have potentially full
takings claims for a 75% or more decline in net profits or to be able to
frame their losses as falling within the partial takings claims for profit
declines of between 25% to 75%.
Category Four: Businesses with Alternative Methods of
Generating Revenue

tn

ot

pe
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Businesses that are able to operate via curbside pick-up, delivery, takeout, e-commerce, and other online methods would be unlikely to have
potential takings claims under current law yet would have much stronger
claims under this Article’s judicial or statutory reforms. Businesses with
alternative revenue streams would not have valid Lucas claims because
their diminution in value would not be over 99%, and courts have been
skeptical of Penn Central takings claims when losses are not “well in excess
of 85%.” 423 Under the economic liberty takings proposal, these businesses
could establish takings claims, if they can show that they had investmentbacked expectations in operating, had decreases in net profits of over 75%,
and there existed no mitigating factor of market causation or a failure to
mitigate the damages through cultivating alternative revenue streams. To
the extent their alternative means of generating revenue meant that their
profits were only reduced 25% to less than 75%, they would be able to
make claims for partial takings compensation under this proposal’s
statutory framework. Even though businesses are adopting online sales
strategies, 424 partial takings claims may be needed to help small businesses
maintain their financial viability. 425 For example, in spite of the ability to
operate via take-out and delivery services, restaurants saw an average 66%
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422 See Lauren Aratani, Hawaii Avoided a Coronavirus Spike—But Its Tourist Economy Is Shattered,
THE GUARDIAN (July , , : AM), https://perma.cc/GDL-ZMFD; see also Wilson Wong,
COVID- Turned College Towns into Ghost Towns and Businesses Are Struggling to Survive, NBC NEWS
(July , , : AM), https://perma.cc/JUR-EGF (discussing the economic fallout that university
shutdowns inflicted on the student-centered businesses of college towns).
423 Walcek v. United States,  Fed. Cl. ,  (), aff’d,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
424 See id.; see also Brandon Brown, Lindsay Hirsch, René Schmutzler, Jasper van Wamelen &
Matteo Zanin, What Consumer-Goods Sales Leaders Must Do to Emerge Stronger from the Pandemic,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. , ), https://perma.cc/ABX-LHND.
425 See Heather Kelly, Small Business Turned to Technology to Survive the Pandemic. But It May Not
Be Enough, WASH. POST (June , ), https://perma.cc/FXF-DVE.
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dip in daily revenue during the spring of 2020 compared to their revenue
from 2019. 426
5.

Categories Five and Six: Businesses with Limited Indoor and
Outdoor Operations
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The last two categories consist of businesses that can have indoor
and/or outdoor operations at limited capacities and would likely fail to
establish temporary regulatory takings under either Penn Central, TahoeSierra, or Lucas. Judges may not be as sympathetic because these
businesses are typically allowed to operate at limited capacities of 25% to
50%. These businesses would have stronger claims under this Article’s
proposed economic liberty takings framework. Depending on the degree
of occupancy/operational constraints, these businesses may not be able to
meet the test of a 75% or more decrease in profits. But these types of
businesses would be prime candidates for the partial-takings statutory
framework, if their net profits declined between 25% and 75% due to the
occupancy/operational limits. Businesses such as restaurants may end up
falling into multiple categories and may have a range of takings claims
based on the severity of the restrictions and resulting extent of lost profits
during different time periods.
In practice, it would be most effective for a business bringing
economic liberty takings claims to approach their arguments in a piecemeal manner. Courts should consider which categories a claimant falls
into and for how long. Businesses should demonstrate the length of time
they have spent in Categories One (bankruptcy), Two (no alternatives),
and Four (some alternatives), with Categories Three (seasonal and
regional), Five (limited outdoor operations), and Six (limited indoor
operations) as complementary categories to substantiate full or partial
takings claims.
The Benefits and Tradeoffs of Economic Liberty Takings

E.
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Establishing economic liberty takings entails benefits, tradeoffs, and
challenges in its implementation and effects. Redefining temporary,
regulatory takings through the courts or through a statutory framework
will lead to more just and efficient results for key players on each side of
the issue—from business owners to governors, legislators, and judges.

Data Dashboard, supra note .
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The Benefits of Establishing Economic Liberty Takings
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An underlying goal of economic liberty takings is to create clear
expectations for government officials, affected businesses, and property
owners. 427 The periodic COVID- shutdowns highlighted how state
governors and local leaders faced no checks on their use of police powers,
save for the distant prospect of electoral accountability. Businesses were
left with no effective legal recourse in the face of overly broad, severe, and
at-times arbitrary shutdown orders, which selectively hamstrung sectors
of the economy while giving windfalls to other sectors. 428
In an emergency, state and local leaders must be able to exercise
discretion in crafting government responses to uphold the public good.
But the logic of economic liberty takings is that the need to compensate
affected business owners would force governors to internalize the
economic costs of their shutdown orders and incentivize them to craft
solutions that inflict less economic damage. Prospectively, the potential
for economic liberty takings compensation would give governors and
other state and local officials incentives to develop better emergency plans
that seek to preserve public health needs and factor in the economic
impact on businesses. Arguably, the fact that state and local leaders did
not have to consider the business impact in crafting shutdown orders led
to an overreliance on this blunt tool and less of a focus on how businesses
could operate safely at a reduced scale throughout this open-ended crisis.
Another benefit is that establishing clear contours for economic
liberty takings should save government resources. The purpose of
economic liberty takings is not to increase litigation, but rather to
encourage regulatory decisions that anticipate the consequences in order
to minimize takings, thus reducing the need for both compensation and
the use of judicial resources. This Article’s categorical statutory
framework would provide a simpler approach to economic liberty takings
by providing more precise guidance concerning the triggers for takings
claims. 429
From a constitutional and theoretical perspective, recognizing
economic liberty takings as an extension of Fifth Amendment takings
upholds basic private property rights. The Takings Clause was created to
protect a subset of individuals from having to unfairly shoulder the

427

See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,  U.S. , – ().
Cf. Spohr, supra note , at  (describing the manner in which the character of the
government action should be assessed).
429 See Kirk Emerson & Charles R. Wise, Statutory Approaches to Regulatory Takings: State Property
Rights Legislation Issues and Implications for Public Administration,  PUB. ADMIN. REV. , –
() (discussing how President Reagan’s  executive order on takings had a similar goal).
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burdens of society when the government takes their property for a public
use. In this case, some segments of the business world have had to
shoulder the burdens of the COVID- pandemic at disproportionate
levels, while other businesses across town or online reaped windfalls from
competitor shutdowns by the state. The injustice of Costco or Walmart
being able to sell every item under the sun—in a socially distanced way)—
while competitors who did not sell food faced periodic closures and
irreversible damage to their businesses raises the type of justice and
fairness concerns that underpin the logic of takings. Expanding the scope
of viable regulatory takings claims under Penn Central and redefining the
scope of temporary takings under Tahoe-Sierra would not only address
some of the deeply conflicting issues within takings law, but also provide
a just avenue of relief for affected businesses.
The Tradeoffs of Applying a Takings Framework to Pandemic
Shutdowns
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While the potential benefits of economic liberty takings are
substantial, they must be balanced against the tradeoffs. One tradeoff of
applying a takings framework to the shutdowns is that it may raise
concerns about tilting the balance too far towards upholding private
interests over broader policy concerns. 430 The sweeping scope of state
police powers may be needed in crises, and government actors may
understandably want to act first due to public necessity and think later
about the consequences for business owners. While that instinct may be
understandable, this Article’s premise is that policy makers need to
balance their exercise of state police and emergency powers with respect
for private property.
Admittedly, some may be concerned that incentivizing restraint in the
exercise of state power may lead to greater deregulation out of fear of
triggering economic liberty takings compensation. However, much of the
deregulation concerns stemming from takings legislation and the
expansion of takings law in general falls within the context of land use and
environmental issues. For many developers and environmental groups,
regulation is indeed a useful tool for advancing their competing interests.
In those contexts, property regulation is often expected because public
interests need to be protected, and changes that may lead to deregulation
may raise legitimate concerns. But pandemic-related regulations had less
of an effect on real property parcels and much more on brick-and-mortar
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430 See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 
ECOLOGY L.Q. , – (); Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 
AM. BUS. L.J. ,  ().
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businesses that reasonably could not have anticipated the pandemic or the
resulting shutdowns. 431 Concerns that economic liberty takings would
lead to broader deregulation appear to be unfounded as this approach is
designed to deal with exogenous regulatory shocks and not the full
spectrum of regulations that businesses are accustomed to addressing.
The goal is not necessarily to encourage the government to regulate less
but to regulate more efficiently and thoughtfully in ways that respect the
investment-backed expectations of businesses.
Other concerns include a surge in takings litigation and resulting
payouts. While a change in the law may lead to an initial increase in
takings claims, this is a relatively small price to pay for the overall benefits
that economic liberty takings reforms will bring to future emergency
situations. In fact, fears of an increase in litigation should encourage
lawmakers to consider utilizing a statutory scheme to complement
judicial takings claims, which could provide a simpler and efficient
administrative process for addressing takings claims. Another concern is
that pandemic takings may incentivize people to engage in rent-seeking
behavior and run their businesses in fraudulent ways that increase their
chances of compensation. Focusing on compensation for decreases in net
profits provides an inherent limiting principle to claims, and it makes it
far easier to verify past baselines due to corporate tax compliance
obligations. It would seem highly unlikely that companies would try to
game the system by overstating their profits one year (and paying the
resulting higher taxes), only to leverage that the following year with an
economic liberty takings claim that uses the past year’s profitability as a
baseline for assessing takings claims. To the extent that abuse concerns
persist, embracing a statutory approach would give lawmakers the ability
to address and refine these concerns.
Another concern about economic liberty takings is that it will strike a
blow against states’ ability to exercise their inherent police powers,
especially during public emergencies. While governments need police
powers to respond to emergencies effectively, it is also important to have
checks on those powers. No democratic government (or governor) should
have unbridled amounts of power under any circumstances. Treating the
pandemic shutdowns as economic liberty takings recognizes the potential
excessiveness of some of these exercises of police power—acts that at
times have “go[ne] too far” in encroaching on private property rights
without compensation. 432 Ultimately, these tradeoffs can be overcome

431
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Cf. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ) (discussing the
factors that should be considered when determining investment expectations).
432 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,  U.S. ,  ().
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when balanced against the benefits of treating shutdown orders as
temporary, regulatory takings.
Conclusion
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This Article has laid out a vision for economic liberty takings that
builds on existing temporary, regulatory takings doctrines and addresses
the shortcomings of this framework in the pandemic shutdown context.
While takings law is often muddled and contradictory, this Article has
shown how the existing doctrinal framework can be applied to businesses
affected by the shutdowns, and how temporary, regulatory takings law can
be expanded to provide businesses with clearer avenues of relief through
the judicial system. The creation of a statutory framework for economic
liberty takings can play a complementary role, especially in opening the
potential for partial takings claims for businesses that faced lower levels
of economic fallout from occupancy and operations restrictions.
While uncertainty continues to surround the pandemic and its aftermath,
the shutdown orders clearly created significant and lasting economic damage for
many businesses. While the shutdowns constitute valid exercises of state police
power, the lack of any check on this authority has led to their overuse. By
recognizing the shutdowns and related restrictions as economic liberty takings,
the ultimate goal is not just to compensate those who have been unduly
burdened, but prospectively to incentivize state governments to develop more
thoughtful and balanced approaches to future emergency limits on private
enterprise.
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